Saṃyutta Nikāya
3. Khandha Vagga
22. Khandha Saṃyutta
6. Upāya Vagga

Sutta 60

Mahāli Suttaṃ

Mahāli

Translated from the Pāḷi
by
Michael M. Olds

 

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[1][pts][than][bodh] I Hear Tell:

Once upon a time, The Lucky man,
Vesāli revisiting,
Great Wood
Peak-roofed Hall.

There then Mahāli the Licchavi
approached the Lucky Man and
drew near.

Having drawn near the Lucky Man and
greeted him with respectful salutation,
he took a seat to one side.

Then having taken a seat to one side
Mahāli the Licchavi
said this to the Lucky Man:

""Pūraṇa Kassapa, bhante, says this:

'There is no force bringing about
nor is there anything that results in^[1]
corruption in beings.^[2]

There is no force bringing about
nor is there anything that results in
virtue^[3] in beings.'

What does the Lucky Man
have to say about this?"

"There are, Mahāli,
forces bringing about
there are things that result in
corruption in beings.

There are forces bringing about,
there are things that result in,
virtue in beings."

"What then, bhante,
is the force that brings about,
what is the thing that results in
corruption in beings?

How does corruption in beings
come about through
a driving force,
by being a result of something?"

Corruption

[ 1 ] "This form,^[4] Mahāli,
were it solely-painful
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not be
attached to their form.

But then, Mahāli,
form being pleasant,
being subject to pleasure,
pervaded by pleasure,
not pervaded by pain,
therefore beings are
attached to their form.

Bound by passion
they are bound to corruption.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
corruption in beings.

[ 2 ] This sense experience,^[5] Mahāli,
were it solely-painful
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not be
attached to their sense experience.

But then, Mahāli,
sense experience being pleasant,
being subject to pleasure,
pervaded by pleasure,
not pervaded by pain,
therefore beings are
attached to their sense experience.

Bound by passion
they are bound to corruption.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
corruption in beings.

[ 3 ] This perception,^[6] Mahāli,
were it solely-painful
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not be
attached to their perception.

But then, Mahāli,
perception being pleasant,
being subject to pleasure,
pervaded by pleasure,
not pervaded by pain,
therefore beings are
attached to their perception.

Bound by passion
they are bound to corruption.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
corruption in beings.

[ 4 ] This own-making,^[7] Mahāli,
were it solely-painful
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not be
attached to their own-making.

But then, Mahāli,
own-making being pleasant,
being subject to pleasure,
pervaded by pleasure,
not pervaded by pain,
therefore beings are
attached to their own-making.

Bound by passion
they are bound to corruption.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
corruption in beings.

[ 5 ] This re-knowing-knowing-knowledge,^[8] Mahāli,
were it solely-painful
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not be
attached to their re-knowing-knowing-knowledge.

But then, Mahāli,
re-knowing-knowing-knowledge being pleasant,
being subject to pleasure,
pervaded by pleasure,
not pervaded by pain,
therefore beings are
attached to their re-knowing-knowing-knowledge.

Bound by passion
they are bound to corruption.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
corruption in beings."

"What then, bhante,
is the force that brings about,
what is the thing that results in
virtue in beings?

How does virtue in beings
come about through
a driving force,
by being a result of something?"

Virtue

[ 6 ] "This form, Mahāli,
were it solely-pleasurable,
not subject to pain,
not pervaded by pain,
pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not get
fed up^[9] with their form.

But then, Mahāli,
form being painful,
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
therefore beings do get
fed up with their form.

Fed up with form
they become dispassionate,
by being dispassionate
they become virtuous.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
virtue in beings.

[ 7 ] "This sense experience, Mahāli,
were it solely-pleasurable,
not subject to pain,
not pervaded by pain,
pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not get
fed up with their sense experience.

But then, Mahāli,
sense experience being painful,
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
therefore beings do get
fed up with their sense experience.

Fed up with sense experience
they become dispassionate,
by being dispassionate
they become virtuous.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
virtue in beings.

[ 8 ] "This perception, Mahāli,
were it solely-pleasurable,
not subject to pain,
not pervaded by pain,
pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not get
fed up with their perception.

But then, Mahāli,
perception being painful,
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
therefore beings do get
fed up with their perception.

Fed up with perception
they become dispassionate,
by being dispassionate
they become virtuous.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
virtue in beings.

[ 9 ] "This own-making, Mahāli,
were it solely-pleasurable,
not subject to pain,
not pervaded by pain,
pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not get
fed up with their own-making.

But then, Mahāli,
own-making being painful,
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
therefore beings do get
fed up with their own-making.

Fed up with own-making
they become dispassionate,
by being dispassionate
they become virtuous.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
virtue in beings.

[ 10 ] "This re-knowing-knowing-knowledge, Mahāli,
were it solely-pleasurable,
not subject to pain,
not pervaded by pain,
pervaded by pleasure,
then beings would not get
fed up with their re-knowing-knowing-knowledge.

But then, Mahāli,
re-knowing-knowing-knowledge being painful,
being subject to pain,
pervaded by pain,
not pervaded by pleasure,
therefore beings do get
fed up with their re-knowing-knowing-knowledge.

Fed up with re-knowing-knowing-knowledge
they become dispassionate,
by being dispassionate
they become virtuous.

This then, Mahāli,
is the force that brings about,
this is the thing that results in
virtue in beings."

 

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^[1] Hetu. Usually translated 'cause' it is at best "proximate cause" the force that drives the thing into existence. It is the 'giddy-up' of the horseback rider, or the 'hi-ya' and the crack of the whip that drives the horses of a carriage. Paccaya. Consequence, result.

^[2] Saṅkilesāya. Stained, tarnished, impure, corrupt, foul.

^[3] Visuddhiyā. brightness, splendor, excellency; (ethically) purity, holiness, sanctification; virtue, rectitude

^[4] Rūpa; form, shape. Used to show that the body is no more than another of the gazillion forms found in the world.

^[5] Vedanā. When spoken of as concerning the non-arahant, this is what is experienced through the senses: pleasant sense experience, painful sense experience or sense experience which is not painful but not pleasant. The idea that this latter is "neutral" sense experience should be avoided and the longer form "not-upleasant-but-not-pleasant" should be used. This is not the arising of a sensation but the non-arising of either of the other sensations.

^[6] Saññā. Once-knowing. It is the first knowing of a named form.

^[7] Saṅkhārā. Saṅ = own, or with; khārā = make. It is the identification with the things made by intentional acts of thought, word and deed. Confounding, construction, co-founding, fabrication, volitional formations (and Woodward's "activities" in a different sense): none of these are "wrong" but all miss the point that the thing being made is identified with as "me" or "mine". It is vitally important when one tries to figure out how to attain Nibbāna when the Buddha has said that Nibbāna is not Saṅkhārāmed. It is the result (paccaya) of following the Magga, but it is not own-made because following the Magga one "not-does" or "lets go" one does not "own-make". The state that is understood then, as Nibbāna has not been made by the self, but is a result of his not doing what obstructs it. You can't say that a thing has been made by an individual when it has been created by his intentional "not-doing" of something else.

^[8] Viññāṇa. Re-knowing-knowing-knowledge because it is the knowledge of knowing that one knows. Vi = re because that knowing is repeated numerous times. Usually translated 'consciousness', that translation misses both the richness of the experience and the way in which the experience is had in different ways for the arahant and for the ordinary person. Knowing is not restricted to that which is known through the senses where consciousness is.

^[9] nibbindeyyuṃ. to get wearied of, to have enough of, be satiated, turn away from, to be disgusted with.