Vinaya Texts
Translated from the Pāli by
T. W. Rhys Davids
and
Hermann Oldenberg
Oxford, the Clarendon Press
[1881]
The Second Part of Volume XVII and Volume XX of The Sacred Books of the East
This work is in the Public Domain.
Reformatted from the Internet Sacred Text Archive version scanned and formatted by Christopher M. Weimer
Kulla Vagga
Fourth Khandhaka
The Settlement of Disputes among the Fraternity
1.
1.1 Now at that time the Blessed Buddha was dwelling at Sāvatthi, in the Ârāma of Anāthapindika. And at that time the Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus used to carry out the formal Acts--the Tagganiya, and the Nissaya, and the Pabbāganiya, and the Patisāraniya, and the Ukkhepaniya--against Bhikkhus who were not present.
Then those Bhikkhus who were modest were annoyed, murmured, and became indignant, saying, 'How can the Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus [act thus][1]?' And those Bhikkhus told the matter to the Blessed One.
'Is it true, O Bhikkhus, as they say, that the Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus carry out the (aforesaid)[1] formal Acts against Bhikkhus who are not present?'
'It is true, Lord!'
The Blessed Buddha rebuked them, saying, 'This is improper (&c., as in I, 1, 2, down to the end).' And when he had thus rebuked them, and had [2] delivered a religious discourse, he addressed the Bhikkhus, and said: 'The formal Acts, O Bhikkhus, the Tagganiya-, the Nissaya-, the Pabbāganiya-, the Patisāraniya-, and the Ukkhepaniya-kammas, ought not to be carried out against Bhikkhus who are not present. Whosoever does so, shall be guilty of a dukkata offence.'
2.
2.1 The single Bhikkhu who speaks not in accordance with the right, the many who speak not in accordance with the right, the Saṅgha which speaks not in accordance with the right. The single Bhikkhu who speaks in accordance with the right, the many who speak in accordance with the right, the Saṅgha which speaks in accordance with the right[2]
Now (it may happen that) the one Bhikkhu who speaks not in accordance with the right may point out (the right course) to a single Bhikkhu who speaks in accordance with the right, or gives him to understand what it is[3], or urges him to see or consider the matter in that light[4], or teaches him, or [3] instructs him, saying, 'This is the Dhamma, this the Vinaya, this the teaching of the Master. Accept this, and approve this.' If the dispute should be thus settled, it is settled contrary to the Dhamma, and with a mere counterfeit of the Vinaya rule of procedure (that cases of dispute must be settled before a duly constituted meeting of the Saṅgha, and in the presence of the accused person)[5].
[And in like manner, if he instruct the many, or the Saṅgha, who speak according to the right;--or if the many or the Saṅgha who speak not according to the right instruct the one, or the many, or the Saṅgha who speak according to the right;-then the dispute is settled contrary to the Dhamma (&c., as before).]
End of the nine cases in which the wrong side decides.
3.
3.1 [This chapter is the contrary of the last; the cases put being those in which the three last members of [4] the mātikā in the first paragraph of chapter 2 instruct, &c., the three first members.]
End of the nine cases in which the right side decides.
4.[6]
4.1 Now at that time the Blessed Buddha was staying at Rāgagaha, in the Kalandaka Nivāpa, in the Bamboo Grove.
Now at that time the venerable Dabba the Mallian, who had realized Arahatship when he was seven years old, had entered into possession of every (spiritual gift) which can be acquired by a disciple; there was nothing left that he ought still to do, nothing left that he ought to gather up of the fruit of his past labour[7]. And when the venerable Dabba the Mallian had retired into solitude, and was sunk in thought, the following consideration presented itself to his mind: 'Arahatship had I [5] acquired when I was seven years old. I have gained everything that a learner can reach to. There is nothing further left for me to do, nothing to gather up of the fruit of that which I have done. What service is it possible for me to render to the Saṅgha?' And it occurred to the venerable Dabba the Mallian: 'It would be a good thing for me to regulate the lodging-places for the Saṅgha, and to apportion the rations of food.'
4.21 And when, at eventide, the venerable Dabba the Mallian had arisen from his meditations, he went to the place where the Blessed One was; and when he had come there he saluted the Blessed One, and took his seat on one side; and when he was so seated the venerable Dabba the Mallian spake thus to the Blessed One:
'When I had retired, Lord, into solitude and was sunk in thought, the following consideration presented itself to my mind (&c., as before, down to) It would be a good thing for me to regulate the lodging-places for the Saṅgha, and to apportion the rations of food. I desire, Lord, [so to do].'
'Very good, Dabba. Do you then regulate the lodging-places for the Saṅgha, and apportion the rations of food!'
'It is well, Lord,' said the venerable Dabba the Mallian, accepting the word of the Blessed One.
4.3 And the Blessed One on that occasion and in that connection, when he had delivered a religious discourse, addressed the Bhikkhus, and said:
'Let then the Saṅgha, O Bhikkhus, appoint Dabba the Mallian as the regulator of lodging-places, and as the apportioner of rations. And thus, O Bhikkhus, should the appointment be made.
[6] 'First Dabba should be asked (whether he is willing to undertake the office). When he has been asked, some able and discreet Bhikkhu should lay the resolution before the Saṅgha, saying,
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me.
'"If it be convenient to the Saṅgha, let the Saṅgha appoint Dabba the Mallian as regulator of lodging-places, and as apportioner of rations. '"This is the resolution (ñatti).
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me.
'"The Saṅgha appoints the venerable Dabba the Mallian as regulator of lodging-places, and as apportioner of rations. Whosoever of the venerable ones agrees that Dabba should be so appointed, let him remain silent; whosoever does not agree, let him speak. The venerable Dabba is appointed by the Saṅgha as regulator of the lodging-places, and as apportioner of rations. The Saṅgha approves thereof. Therefore is it silent. Thus do I understand."'
4.4 And the venerable Dabba the Mallian, being so chosen, appointed one lodging-place in the same place for the Bhikkhus who belonged to the same division. For those Bhikkhus who were repeaters of the Suttantas he appointed a lodging-place together, thinking, 'They will be able to chant over the Suttantas to one another.' For those Bhikkhus who were in charge of the Vinaya he appointed a lodging-place together, thinking, 'They will be able to discuss the Vinaya one with another.' For those Bhikkhus who were preachers of the Dhamma he appointed a lodging-place together, thinking, 'They will be able to talk over the Dhamma one with another.' For those Bhikkhus who were given to [7] meditation[8] he appointed one lodging-place together, thinking, 'They will not disturb one another.' For those Bhikkhus who were wise in worldly lore, and abounding in bodily vigour[9], he appointed one lodging-place together, thinking, 'These venerable ones, too, will thus remain settled according to their pleasure.' And for such Bhikkhus as came in late, for them he caught fire,[10] and by the light of the flame thereof he pointed out to them a lodging-place.
So much so[11] that Bhikkhus of set purpose would come in late, thinking, 'We shall thus behold the power of the Iddhi of the venerable Dabba the Mallian.' And they went up to the venerable Dabba the Mallian, and said: 'Appoint us, O venerable Dabba, a lodging-place.'
And to them the venerable Dabba the Mallian would speak thus: 'Where do the venerable ones desire to rest? Where shall I appoint it?'
And they of set purpose would designate some place afar, saying, 'May the venerable Dabba appoint us a lodging-place on the Vulture's Peak; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place at the Robber's Cliff; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place at the Black Rock on the Isigili Passa; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging on the Vebhāra Passa; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in the Sattapanni Cave; may the [8] venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in the mountain cave of the Snake's Pool in Sîta's Wood; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in the Gomata Grotto; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in the cave of the Tinduka Tree; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place at the Tapoda Ghāt; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in the Tapoda Ârāma; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in Gîvaka's Mango Grove; may the venerable one appoint us a lodging-place in the deer-park at Maddakukkhi.'
And the venerable Dabba the Mallian would burst into flame, and walk on in front of them with his finger burning, and they by the light thereof would follow close upon the venerable Dabba the Mallian. And the venerable Dabba the Mallian would appoint them a lodging-place, saying, 'This is the couch, and this the stool, and this the mat, and this the pillow, and this the privy place, and this the drinking-water[12], and this the water for washing, and this the staff[13], and this the form of (the result of) the consultation of the Saṅgha[14], that at such and such a time are you to enter thereon, and at such and such a time are you to depart therefrom[15].' And when the [9] venerable Dabba the Mallian had thus appointed unto them their lodging-place, he would return back again to the Bamboo Grove.
4.5 Now at that time the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka[16] had been but recently received into the Saṅgha, and were wanting in merit, and such among the lodging-places appertaining to the Saṅgha as were inferior fell to their lot, and the inferior rations[17].
Now at that time the people of Rāgagaha were desirous of presenting to the Thera Bhikkhus a wishing-gift[18], to wit, ghee and oil and dainty bits[19]; while to the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka they used to give an ordinary gift according to their ability, to wit, scraps of food and sour gruel with it[20].
[10] When they had returned from their receipt of alms, and had eaten their meal, they asked the Thera Bhikkhus, 'What did you get, Sirs, at the place of alms; what did you get?'
Some of the Theras answered, Sirs; 'We had ghee, we had oil, we had dainty bits.'
The Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka replied: 'We got nothing at all, Sirs; just an ordinary gift such as they could manage, scraps of food, and sour gruel with it.'
4.6 Now at that time a certain householder, possessed of good food[21], used to give a perpetual alms to the Saṅgha, a meal for four Bhikkhus. He with his wife and children used to stand at the place of alms and serve; and offer to some Bhikkhus boiled rice, and to some congey, and to some oil, and to some dainty bits.
Now at that time the meal for the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka had been fixed for the morrow at the house of this prosperous householder. 'And the prosperous householder went to the Ârāma for some business or other, and went up to the place where the venerable Dabba the Mallian was. And when he had come there, he saluted the venerable Dabba the Mallian, and took his seat on one side. And him so seated did the venerable Dabba instruct, and arouse, and gladden, and incite with religious discourse.
And when the prosperous householder had thus been instructed, and aroused, and gladdened, and incited by the venerable Dabba the Mallian with [11] religious discourse, he said to the venerable Dabba the Mallian: 'For whom, Sir, has the meal been appointed to-morrow at our house?'
'The meal has been appointed, my friend, at your house to-morrow for those Bhikkhus who are followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka.'
Then the prosperous householder was ill-pleased, thinking, 'How can bad Bhikkhus enjoy themselves at our house?' And going home he gave command to the slave-girl: 'For those who come to-morrow for the meal, spread out the mats in the entrance hall[22], and serve them with scraps of food, and with sour gruel with it!'
'Even so, Sir!' said the slave-girl, accepting the word of the householder.
4.7 Then the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka spake one to another: 'Yesterday a meal has been appointed for us at the house of the prosperous householder. To-morrow he, with his wife and children, will attend upon us at the place of alms, and serve us. And he will offer to some of us boiled rice, and to some congey, and to some oil, and to some dainty bits. And through joy thereat they slept uneasily that night.
Then the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka, having robed themselves in the early morning, went duly bowled and robed to the dwelling-place of the prosperous householder. And that slave-girl saw the Bhikkhus who were followers [12] of Mettiya and Bhummagaka approaching from afar; and spreading out the mats in the entrance hall, she said to them, 'Be seated, Sirs.'
And the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka thought: 'For a certainty the meal cannot yet be ready, since we are told to take our seats in the entrance.'
Then the slave-girl coming up with scraps of food, and sour gruel with it, said to them, 'Eat, Sirs!'
'We, sister, are of those for whom perpetual meals are provided.'
'I know, Sirs, that you are so. But only yesterday I received command from the householder that for them who should come to-morrow for the meal I was to spread out the mats in the entrance hall, and serve them with scraps of food, and some gruel with it. Eat, Sirs!'
Then the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka thought: 'It was yesterday that the householder, the prosperous one, came to the Ârāma to visit Dabba the Mallian. For a certainty the householder must have been set against us by Dabba the Mallian.' And through sorrow thereat they ate uneasily. And the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka, when they had finished their meal, returned from the receipt of alms, went to the Ârāma, and laid aside their bowls and their robes, and sat down outside the porch of the Ârāma, squatting against their waist cloths[23], [13] silent, and ashamed, with fallen hearts[24], and sunken faces, moody, and bewildered[25].
4.8 Now the Bhikkhunî Mettiyā came up to the place where the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka were: and when she had come there she said to them: 'My salutation to you, Sirs[26]!'
When she had so said the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka did not speak to her. So a second time she said to them: 'My salutation to you, Sirs!' and they did not speak. And a third time she said to them: 'My salutation to you, Sirs!' Still the third time the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka did not speak. And she said: 'Wherein have I offended you, Sirs? Wherefore do you not speak to me?'
'Are you then so indifferent[27], sister, when we are tormented by Dabba the Mallian?'
'But what can I do, Sirs?'
[14] 'If you like, sister, you could this very day make the Blessed One expel the venerable Dabba the Mallian.'
'But what shall I do, Sirs? What is it that it is in my power to do?'
'Come now, sister; do you go to the place where the Blessed One is, and when you have come there say as follows: "This, Lord, is neither fit nor proper that the very quarter of the heavens which should be safe, secure, and free from danger, that from that very quarter should come danger, calamity, and distress--that where one might expect a calm, one should meet a gale. Methinks the very water has taken fire. I have been defiled, Lord, by Dabba the Mallian!'
'Very well, Sirs!' said the Bhikkhunî Mettiyā, accepting the word of the followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka. And she went to the Blessed One [and spake even as she had been directed].
4.9 Then the Blessed One, on that occasion and in that connection, convened a meeting of the Saṅgha, and asked the venerable Dabba the Mallian:
'Are you conscious[28], Dabba, of having done such a thing as this Bhikkhunî says?'
'Even as my Lord, the Blessed One, knows me.' [And a second and a third time the Blessed One asked the same question, and received the same reply.]
[15] Then said the Blessed One: 'The Dabbas, O Dabba, do not thus repudiate[29]. If you have done it, say so. If you have not done it, say you have not.'
'Since I was born, Lord, I cannot call to mind[30] that I have practised sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when I was awake!'
And the Blessed One addressed the Bhikkhus, and said: 'Expel then, O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhunî Mettiyā, and examine those Bhikkhus about it.' And so saying he rose from his seat and entered into the Vihāra.
Then those Bhikkhus expelled the Bhikkhunî Mettiyā. But the Bhikkhus who were followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka said to those Bhikkhus: 'Do not, Sirs, expel the Bhikkhunî Mettiyā. She has not committed any offence. She has been set on by us with angry and bitter intentions of causing his fall.'
'What then, Sirs? is it you who are thus harassing the venerable Dabba the Mallian with a groundless charge and breach of morality?'
'That is true, Sirs.'
Then those Bhikkhus who were moderate were indignant and annoyed and complained, saying, 'How can these Bhikkhus the followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka harass the venerable Dabba the Mallian with a groundless charge of breach of [16] morality?' And they told the matter to the Blessed One.
'Is this true, O Bhikkhus?'
'It is true, Lord.'
Then he rebuked them, and when he had delivered a religious discourse, he addressed the Bhikkhus, and said:
Let then the Saṅgha grant to Dabba the Mallian, whose conscience in respect of this matter is quite clear, the Proceeding for the consciously innocent[31].
4.10 'And thus, O Bhikkhus, is it to be granted.
'Let that Dabba the Mallian go before the Saṅgha, and having arranged his robe over one shoulder, let him bow down at the feet of the senior Bhikkhus; and crouching down[32], let him stretch [17] forth his hands with the palms joined together, and let him say, "These Bhikkhus, Sirs, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka, are harassing me by a groundless charge of breach of morality. But I, Sirs, in respect thereof have a clear conscience, and I ask the Saṅgha for the acquittal to be accorded to those who are conscious of innocence." Then some able and discreet Bhikkhu is thus to lay the resolution (ñatti) before the Saṅgha. "Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. These Bhikkhus, Sirs, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummagaka, are harassing the venerable Dabba the Mallian with a groundless charge of a breach of morality, and the venerable Dabba the Mallian has in respect thereof a conscience that is clear, and asks the Saṅgha for the acquittal of those who are conscious of innocence. If the time is convenient to the Saṅgha, let the Saṅgha accord to the venerable Dabba the Mallian the acquittal of those who are conscious of innocence. This is the resolution. Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. These Bhikkhus (&c., as before, down to) asks the Saṅgha for the acquittal of those who are conscious of innocence. The Saṅgha accords to the venerable Dabba the Mallian the acquittal of those who are consciously innocent. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves of the grant to Dabba the Mallian of the acquittal of those who are conscious of innocence, let him keep silence, Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. And a second time I say the same thing. And a third time I say the same thing. Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. These Bhikkhus (&c., as before, down to) let him speak. The acquittal of those who are conscious of innocence has been [18] granted by the Saṅgha to Dabba the Mallian. The Saṅgha approves thereof. Therefore is it silent. Thus do I understand[33]."'
4.11 'There are five things which make a grant of acquittal to those who are conscious of innocence to be according to law. The Bhikkhu must be innocent and without offence, others must have censured him, he must ask the Saṅgha for acquittal as being conscious of innocence, the Saṅgha must grant it, the Saṅgha must be duly held and duly constituted. These, O Bhikkhus, are the five things which make a grant of the acquittal of those who are conscious of innocence to be according to law.'
5.
5.1[34] Now at that time the Bhikkhu Gagga was insane and out of his mind; and by him, when so insane and out of his mind, many things unworthy of a samana had been committed, as well in speech as in act[35]. The Bhikkhus warned the Bhikkhu Gagga of a fault so committed by him when insane and out of his mind, saying, 'Does the venerable one call to [19] mind that he has committed such and such an offence?'
He replied, 'I, my friends, was insane and out of my mind. (No doubt) many things unworthy of a samana, as well in speech as in act, may have been committed by me when so insane and out of my mind. But I do not recollect it. It was done by me by reason of my insanity.'
But though they received that answer from him[36], they warned him still, saying, 'Does the venerable one call to mind that he has committed such and such an offence?'
'Those Bhikkhus who were moderate were annoyed, murmured, and became indignant, saying, "How can those Bhikkhus warn the Bhikkhu Gagga . . . saying . . . such and such an offence?" And when he replies, "I, my friends, was insane . . . by reason of my insanity"--how can those Bhikkhus still warn him, saying . . . of such and such an offence?'
And those Bhikkhus told the matter to the Blessed One.
'Is it true, O Bhikkhus, that those Bhikkhus (&c., as before, down to) such and such an offence?'
'It is true, Lord.'
Then he rebuked them, and when he had delivered a religious discourse he addressed the Bhikkhus, and said:
'Let then the Saṅgha grant to Gagga the [20] Bhikkhu who is now sane the dispensation for those who are no longer insane.
5.2 'And thus, O Bhikkhus, should it be granted.
'Let that Bhikkhu Gagga [here follow the words of the formal request, of the resolution, and of the grant by decision of the Saṅgha, exactly in the same way as in the last case, chapter 4, § 10].'
6.
6.1 'There are three cases, O Bhikkhus, in which grants of dispensation for those who are no longer insane are not valid: and three cases in which such grants are valid.
'What are the three cases in which grants of dispensation for those who are no longer insane are not valid?
'In the first place, O Bhikkhus, in case a Bhikkhu have committed an offence: and in respect thereof either the Saṅgha, or a number of Bhikkhus, or a single Bhikkhu, warn him, saying, "Does the venerable one call to mind that he has been guilty of such and such an offence?" And he, notwithstanding that he does remember it, says, "I do not remember, Sirs, that I have been guilty of such and such an offence." Then if the Saṅgha grant him the dispensation of those who are no longer insane, that grant is not valid.
'Again, O Bhikkhus, in case a Bhikkhu (&c., as before, down to) And he, notwithstanding that he does remember it, says, "I remember it, Sirs, but as if in a dream." Then if the Saṅgha grant him [21] the dispensation of those who are no longer insane, that grant is not valid.
Again, O Bhikkhus, in case a Bhikkhu have committed an offence, and in respect thereof either the Saṅgha, or a number of Bhikkhus, or a single Bhikkhu, warn him, saying, "Does the venerable one call to mind that he has been guilty of such and such an offence?" And he, though he is not insane, acts in the (deceptive) way of an insane person[37], saying, "I act so, and you act so likewise. It beseems me, and it likewise beseems you." Then if the Saṅgha grant him the dispensation of those who are no longer insane, that grant is not valid.
These are the three cases, O Bhikkhus, in which a grant of the dispensation for those who are no longer insane is not valid.
6.2 'What are the three cases in which grants of dispensation for those who are no longer insane are valid?
'In the first place, O Bhikkhus, in case a Bhikkhu be insane and out of his mind; and by him, when so insane and out of his mind, many things unworthy of a samana have been committed, as well in speech as in act. And either the Saṅgha, or a number of Bhikkhus, or a single Bhikkhu, warns him in respect thereof, saying, "Does the venerable one call to mind that he has committed such and such an offence?" And he really not remembering it, answers, "I do not remember, Sirs, that I have been guilty of such and such an offence." Then if the Saṅgha grants him the dispensation for those who are no longer insane, that grant is valid.
[22] 'Again, O Bhikkhus, in case a Bhikkhu be insane and out of his mind (&c., as before, down to) And he, not really remembering it, answers, "I remember it, Sirs, but as if in a dream." Then if the Saṅgha grants him the dispensation for those who are no longer insane, that grant is valid.
'Again, O Bhikkhus, in case a Bhikkhu be insane and out of his mind (&c., as before, down to) "Does the venerable one call to mind that he has been guilty of such and such an offence?" And he, being still insane, acts in the way of an insane person, saying, "I act so, and you act so likewise. It beseems me, and it likewise beseems you." Then if the Saṅgha (afterwards) grant him the dispensation for those who are no longer insane, that grant is valid.
'These are the three cases, O Bhikkhus, in which the grant of the dispensation for those who are no longer insane is valid.'
7.
7.1 Now at that time the Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus carried out official acts against Bhikkhus who had not confessed themselves guilty--the Tagganiya-kamma, or the Nissaya-kamma, or the Pabbāganiya-kamma, or the Patisāraniya-kamma, or the Ukkhepaniya-kamma.
Those Bhikkhus who were moderate were annoyed, murmured, and became indignant, saying, 'How can the Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus (&c., as before).' And those Bhikkhus told the matter to the Blessed One.
[23] 'Is it true, O Bhikkhus, that the Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus do so?'
'It is true, Lord.'
Then he rebuked them, and when he had delivered a religious discourse, he addressed the Bhikkhus, and said:
No official act, O Bhikkhus,--whether the Tagganiya-kamma, or the Nissaya-kamma, or the Pabbāganiya-kamma, or the Patisāraniya-kamma, or the Ukkhepaniya-kamma,--is to be carried out against Bhikkhus who have not confessed themselves guilty[38]. Whosoever does so, shall be guilty of a dukkata offence.'
8.
8.1 'Now, O Bhikkhus, an official act carried out against a Bhikkhu who has confessed himself guilty is invalid as follows, and is valid as follows. And how does such an official act become invalid? In case a Bhikkhu have committed a Pārāgika offence, and in respect thereof either the Saṅgha, or a number of Bhikkhus, or a single Bhikkhu warns him, saying, "The venerable one has been guilty of a Pārāgika." And he replies thus, "I have not, Sirs, been guilty of a Pārāgika. I have been guilty of a Samghādisesa." And in respect thereof the Saṅgha deals with him for a Samghādisesa. Then that official act is invalid.'
[24] [And so also if on being warned of any one of the seven offences[39] he confesses himself to be guilty of any one of the offences different from the one charged, then the official act is invalid.]
8.2 'And when, O Bhikkhus, is such an official act valid? In case a Bhikkhu have committed a Pārāgika offence, and in respect thereof the Saṅgha, or a number of Bhikkhus, or a single Bhikkhu warns him, saying, "The venerable one has been guilty of a Pārāgika." And he replies, "Yea, Sirs, I have been guilty of a Pārāgika." And in respect thereof the Saṅgha deals with him for a Pārāgika. Then that official act is valid[40].'
[And so for each of the other offences mentioned in § 1, the whole of § 2 is repeated.]
9.[41]
9.1 Now at that time the Bhikkhus in chapter (Saṅgha) assembled, since they became violent, quarrelsome, and disputatious, and kept on wounding one another with sharp words[42], were unable [25] to settle the disputed question (that was brought before them).
They told this matter to the Blessed One.
[43]'I allow you, O Bhikkhus, to settle such a dispute by the vote of the majority. A Bhikkhu who shall be possessed of five qualifications shall be appointed as taker of the voting tickets--one who does not walk in partiality, one who does not walk in malice, one who does not walk in folly, one who does not walk in fear[44], one who knows what (votes) have been taken and what have not been taken.
'And thus shall he be appointed.
'First the Bhikkhu is to be requested (whether he will undertake the office). Then some able and discreet Bhikkhu is to bring the matter before the Saṅgha, saying,
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. If the time seems meet to the Saṅgha, let the Saṅgha appoint a Bhikkhu of such and such a name as taker of the voting tickets.
'"This is the motion (ñatti).
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. The Saṅgha appoints a Bhikkhu of such and such a name as taker of the tickets. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves of the Bhikkhu of such and such a name being appointed as taker of the [26] tickets, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. The Bhikkhu of such and such a name is appointed by the Saṅgha as taker of the voting tickets. Therefore is it silent. Thus do I understand.'"
10.[45]
10.1 'There are ten cases, O Bhikkhus, in which the taking of votes is invalid; and ten in which the taking of votes is valid.
'Which are the ten in which the taking of votes is invalid? When the matter in dispute is trivial[46]--when the case has not run its course (that is, when. the necessary preliminaries of submission to arbitration have not been carried out[47])--when regarding the matter in dispute the Bhikkhus have not formally remembered, or been formally called upon to remember, the offence[48]--when the taker of votes[49] knows that those whose opinions are not in accordance with the law will be in the majority, [27] or probably[50] may be in the majority--when he knows that the voting will result in a schism in the Saṅgha--when he is in doubt whether the voting will result in a schism in the Saṅgha--when the votes are irregularly given[51]--when all do not vote equally[52]--and when they do not vote in accordance with the view (which they really hold). These are the ten cases in which the voting is invalid[53].
10.2 'And which are the ten cases in which the voting is valid?'
[The ten cases are precisely the reverse of the other ten.]
11.
11.1 Now at that time the Bhikkhu Uvāla[54], being examined in the midst of the Saṅgha with an offence, when he had denied then confessed it, when he had confessed it then denied it, made [28] counter-charges[55], and spoke lies which he knew to be such[56].
Those Bhikkhus who were moderate were annoyed, murmured, and became indignant, saying, 'How can the Bhikkhu Uvāla do so?' And they told the matter to the Blessed One.
'Is it true, O Bhikkhus, as they say that the Bhikkhu [&c., as before].'
'It is true, Lord.'
Then he rebuked him, and when he had delivered a religious discourse he addressed the Bhikkhus, and said:
'Then, O Bhikkhus, let the Saṅgha carry out the Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma (the Proceeding in the case of the obstinately wrong)[57].'
11.2 'And thus, O Bhikkhus, is it to be carried out. In the first place the Bhikkhu Uvāla must have been warned; when he had been warned, he must have been called upon to remember (whether he has, or has not, consciously committed the offence); when he had been called upon to remember, he must have been caused (by being put on his trial with respect to the offence) to bring upon himself a new [29] offence (namely, of obstinacy or prevarication); when he has brought upon himself this new offence, some discreet and able Bhikkhu ought to lay the matter before the Saṅgha, saying,
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear the. This Bhikkhu Uvāla, being examined in the midst of the Saṅgha with an offence, when he has denied it then confesses it, when he has confessed it then denies it, makes counter-charges, and speaks lies which he knows to be such. If the time seems meet to the Saṅgha, let the Saṅgha carry out the Tassapāpiyyasikā-kamma against the Bhikkhu Uvāla.
'"This is the motion.
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. This Bhikkhu Uvāla (&c., as before). The Saṅgha carries out the Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma against Uvāla the Bhikkhu. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves of the Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma being carried out against Uvāla the Bhikkhu, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak.
'"A second time I say the same thing. This Bhikkhu Uvāla (&c., as before, down to) let him speak. A third time I say the same thing (&c., as before, down to) let him speak.
'"The Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma has been carried out by the . Saṅgha against Uvāla the Bhikkhu. Therefore is it silent. Thus do I understand[58]."'
12.
12.1 [30] 'There are five things, O Bhikkhus, which are necessary to the valid carrying out of the Tassapāpiyyasikā-kamma. To wit--he is impure, he is shameless--a censure has been set on foot against him[59]--the Saṅgha carries out the Kamma--it carries it out lawfully, and in a full quorum.
12.2 'There are three things, O Bhikkhus, by which, when a Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma is characterised, it is against the Dhamma, and against the Vinaya, and difficult to be settled; (that is to say), when it has not been carried out in a full assembly of properly qualified persons, according to law and justice, and in the presence of the litigant parties--when it has been carried out without the accused person having been heard--when it has been carried out without the accused person having confessed himself guilty.
'These are the three things, O Bhikkhus, by which, when a Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma is characterised, it is against the Dhamma, and against the Vinaya, and difficult to be settled.
There are three things by which (and as in last paragraph) it is in accordance with the Dhamma, and in accordance with the Vinaya, and easy to be settled; (that is to say), when it has been [&c., the rest of this paragraph is the reverse of the last][60].'
[31] 12.3 [This paragraph exactly corresponds to Kullavagga I, 4, paragraph 1, as to the three cases in which the Saṅgha, if it likes, may carry out the Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma against a Bhikkhu.]
12.4 [In this paragraph the 'right conduct' for a Bhikkhu who has been subjected to this Kamma is laid down precisely as in I, 5 for a Bhikkhu subjected to the Tagganiya-kamma.]
Then the Saṅgha carried out the Tassa-pāpiyyasikā-kamma against Uvāla the Bhikkhu.
13.[61]
13.1 Now at that time, while the Bhikkhus were continuing in quarrels, strifes, and disputes, they had been guilty of many things unworthy of a Samana, as well in word as in deed, and it occurred to the Bhikkhus, 'Whilst we were continuing, &c. . . . we have been guilty, &c. . . . as well in word as in deed. If we now deal one with another for those offences, it may happen that that proceeding may result in harshness, in ill-feeling, in divisions. How now should we manage?'
And they told the matter to the Blessed One.
In case, O Bhikkhus, whilst the Bhikkhus are continuing, &c. . . . they are guilty, &c. . . . as well in word as in deed. And it occurs to them, "Whilst we were continuing, &c. . . . we have been guilty, &c. . . . If we now deal, &c. . . . How now shall [32] we manage?" I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle a matter of this kind by Tinavatthāraka (the Covering over as with grass)[62].
13.2 'And thus, O Bhikkhus, is it to be settled. All are to meet together in one spot. When they have met together some able and discreet Bhikkhu is to bring the matter before the Saṅgha, saying,
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. While we were continuing, &c. . . . we have been guilty, &c. . . . as well in word as in deed. And it occurred to us (&c., down to) If we now deal one with another, &c. . . . it may result in harshness, in ill-feeling, in divisions. If the time seems meet to the Saṅgha; let the Saṅgha settle this matter by the Covering over as with grass--except only as regards serious offences[63], and as regards those things in which the laity have been concerned."
'Then some discreet and able Bhikkhu among those Bhikkhus who belong to the one party is to bring the matter before his own party, saying,
'"May the venerable ones hear me. While we were continuing, &c. . . . we have been guilty, &c. . . . as well in word as in deed. And it occurred to us, &c. . . . (down to) in divisions. If the time seems meet to you, venerable Sirs, I would confess in the midst of the Saṅgha, both on your behalf, venerable Sirs, and on my own behalf, both such offence as is yours, venerable Sirs, and such offence [33] as is mine own, to the end that it may be covered over as with grass, except only as regards serious offences, and as regards those things in which the laity have been concerned."
'And some discreet and able Bhikkhu among the Bhikkhus belonging to the other party is to bring the matter before his own party, saying, "May the venerable ones hear me [&c., as before in the last paragraph, down to the end]."
Then the discreet and able Bhikkhu among the Bhikkhus belonging to the one party is to bring the matter before the Saṅgha, saying, "May the venerable Saṅgha hear me. While we (&c., as before, down to) in divisions. If the time seems meet to the Saṅgha, I would confess[64] in the midst of the Saṅgha, both on behalf of these venerable ones and on my own behalf, both such offence as is theirs and such offence as is mine own, to the end that it may be covered over as with grass, except only as regards serious offences, and as regards those things in which the laity have been concerned. This is the motion Patti). May the venerable Saṅgha hear me. While we (&c., as before, down to) in divisions. I confess (&c., as before, down to) in which the laity have been concerned. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves of the confession of these our offences, to the end that they may so be covered over as with grass, except as before mentioned, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. These our offences are confessed in the midst of the Saṅgha, to the end that they may be covered over as with grass, except [34] as before mentioned. The Saṅgha approves thereof. Therefore is it silent. Thus do I understand."
'And the discreet and able Bhikkhu among the Bhikkhus belonging to the other party is to bring the matter before the Saṅgha, saying, "Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me (&c., as before in the last paragraph, down to the end)."
'Then thus, O Bhikkhus, those Bhikkhus are absolved of those offences, except as regards serious offences, and as regards those things in which the laity have been concerned, and except also as regards those who express their disapproval of the proceedings, or who are not present at them[65].'
14.
14.1 Now at that time Bhikkhus had disputes with Bhikkhus, and Bhikkhunîs with Bhikkhus. And the Bhikkhu Khanna[66], forcing his way (into the apartments) of the Bhikkhunîs took the part of the Bhikkhunîs[67], and disputed with the Bhikkhus.
[35] Those Bhikkhus who were moderate were indignant, &c. . . . told the Blessed One, &c. . . . he addressed the Bhikkhus, and said:
14.2 'There are, O Bhikkhus, the following four kinds of legal questions that require formal settlement by the Saṅgha; (that is to say), legal questions arising out of disputes, legal questions arising out of censure, legal questions arising out of offences, legal questions arising out of business[68].
'Among these, what is a legal question arising out of dispute? This, O Bhikkhus, is when Bhikkhus dispute, saying, "This is Dhamma," or "This is not Dhamma," or "This is Vinaya," or "This is not Vinaya," or "This is taught and spoken by the Tathāgata," or "This is not taught nor spoken by the Tathāgata," or "This has been practised by the Tathāgata," or "This has not been practised by the Tathāgata," or "This has been ordained by the Tathāgata," or "This has not been ordained by the Tathāgata," or "This is an offence," or "This is not an offence," or "This is a slight offence," or "This is a grievous offence," or "This is an offence which can be done away," or "This is an offence which cannot be done away[69]," or "This is a most grave offence," or "This is not a most grave [36] offence." Whatsoever quarrel, strife, controversy, difference of opinion, contradiction, opposition, cantankerousness[70], or contention there may be on such a matter, this is called a legal question arising out of dispute.
'And among these, which is a legal question arising out of censure? This, O Bhikkhu, is when Bhikkhus charge a Bhikkhu with a fault of morality, or of conduct, or of opinion, or of means of livelihood. Whatsoever charge, censure, incrimination[71], admonition[71], candid opinion[72], making of excuses[73] for a person, or making fun of him, there may be, that is called a legal question arising out of censure.
'And among these, what is a legal question arising out of offence? The five groups of offences[74] are subjects of legal questions of offences, and the seven groups of offences[75] are subjects of legal questions of offence. This is what is called a legal question arising out of offence.
'And among these, what is a legal question of business? Whatsoever is to the Saṅgha a matter which ought to be done, an obligation, a matter for which leave ought to be formally asked, the proposal [37] of a resolution[76], the proceeding by is a ñatti-dutiya-kamma[77], or by ñatti-katuttha-kamma[77], that is called a legal question of business.
14.3 'What is that which gives rise to a legal question of dispute? There are six causes of dispute that give rise to legal questions of dispute. And there are three causes of wrong-doing that give rise to legal questions of dispute, and three causes of right-doing that give rise to legal questions of dispute. And which are these six?
'In the first place, O Bhikkhus, there is the Bhikkhu who is angry, and who bears enmity in his heart. Whatsoever Bhikkhu, O Bhikkhus, is such an angry man bearing enmity in his heart, he remains without reverence for, and without delight in the Teacher, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, and does not fulfil all the duties of a disciple. And whatsoever Bhikkhu, O Bhikkhus, remains without reverence for, and without delight in the Teacher, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, and does not fulfil all the duties of a disciple, he causes disputes to arise in the Saṅgha, and such a dispute becomes a cause [38] of woe, and of want, and of disaster to the great multitudes, of woe and of want to gods and men. If you, therefore, O Bhikkhus, perceive such a one, a root of disputes both internal and external, do you exert yourselves, O Bhikkhus, to put away from you so evil a person, the root of those disputes. If you perceive, O Bhikkhus, no such person, take pains lest any such evil root of disputes should thereafter arise among you. Thus will so evil a root of disputes be put away from you, and thus will no such evil person, the root of. disputes, arise hereafter among you.
'Again, O Bhikkhus, there is the Bhikkhu, who is a hypocrite[78], and who hides his faults; who is envious and jealous; who is crafty and treacherous; who has sinful desires and false beliefs; who is tarnished by love of worldly gain, devoted to getting and taking, for whom to renounce a thing is hard. Whatsoever Bhikkhu, O Bhikkhus, is thus a hypocrite, who hides his faults, he remains [&c., as before, the whole of the last paragraph down to the end being repeated in each of the cases here enumerated].
14.4 'And which are the three causes of wrong-doing which give rise to legal questions of dispute?
'Herein, O Bhikkhus, men of greedy mind are given to dispute, men of evil mind are given to dispute, men of foolish mind are given to dispute, saying, "This is Dhamma," or "This is not Dhamma" [&c., as before, in § 2, down to] or "This is not a [39] most grave offence." These are the three causes of wrong-doing which give rise to legal questions of dispute.
'And which are the three causes of right-doing which give rise to legal questions of dispute?
'In the first place, O Bhikkhus, men not of greedy mind [&c., as in the last paragraph, inserting the word "not"].
14.5 'And what is that, O Bhikkhus, which gives rise to legal questions of censure? There are six causes of censure that give rise to legal questions of censure. And there are three causes of wrong-doing that give rise to legal questions of censure. And there are three causes of right-doing that give rise to legal questions of censure. And the body gives rise to legal questions of censure, and speech gives rise to legal questions of censure.'
[The six are word for word the same as in the last section, reading 'censure' for 'dispute.']
'And which are the three causes of wrong-doing that give rise to legal questions of censure?
'Herein, O Bhikkhus, men of greedy mind are given to censure, men of evil mind are given to censure, men of foolish mind are given to censure, accusing others of breaches of morality, or of behaviour, or of error in doctrine, or of adopting a wrong means of livelihood. These are the three causes of wrong-doing that give rise to legal questions of censure.'
[There follow the three causes of right-doing, reading 'men not of greedy mind,' &c., as before, end of § 4.]
And how does the body give rise to legal questions of censure? In case a man be ill-favoured, [40] or ugly, or a dwarf[79], or diseased, or blind of one eye, or lame, or humpbacked, or crippled, people find fault with him on that account. This is how the body gives rise to legal questions of censure.
'And how does speech give rise to legal questions of censure? In case a man have a bad voice, or be indistinct, or harsh in speech[80], then people find fault with him on that account. This is how speech gives rise to legal questions of censure.
14.6 'And what is it that gives rise to legal questions of offence? There are six origins of offence that give rise to legal questions of offence. There is an offence that originates in deed, but not in word nor in thought. There is an offence that originates in word, but not in deed nor in thought. There is an offence that originates in deed and in word, but not in thought. There is an offence that originates in deed and in thought, but not in word. There is an offence that originates in word and in thought, but not in deed. There is an offence that originates in deed and in word and in thought. These are the six (&c.)
14.7 'And what is that which gives rise to legal questions of business? There is one thing that gives rise to legal questions of business, that is to say, the Saṅgha.
[41] 14.8 'Legal questions of dispute. Right. Wrong. Undetermined[81].
'A legal question arising out of dispute may be right, and it may be wrong, and it may be undetermined. Of these, which is the legal question arising out of dispute which is right?
'In case, O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhu of right mind discuss, saying, "This is the Dhamma," or "This is not the Dhamma" (&c., as before, in § 2, down to) or "This is not a most grave offence." Whatsoever quarrel, strife, contention, difference of opinion, contradiction, opposition, cantankerousness, or contention there may be in such a discussion is called a legal question arising out of dispute that is right.'
[And so when the Bhikkhus have a wrong mind, or an undetermined mind, the legal question arising out of such dispute is respectively a legal question arising out of dispute that is wrong or undetermined.]
14.9 'Legal questions of censure. Right. Wrong. Undetermined.'
[It may be either of the three, according as the Bhikkhus censuring (as in § 5) have a right, wrong, or an undetermined mind. The form of the paragraph corresponds to § 8 throughout.]
14.10 'Legal questions of offence. Right. Wrong. Undetermined.
There may be a legal question whether an offence is wrong, and there may be a legal question [42] whether an offence is undetermined. There is no legal question whether an offence be right.
'Of these, which is a legal question whether an offence be wrong? Whatsoever transgression be committed knowingly, consciously, and deliberately, this is called a legal question whether an offence be wrong.
'And of these, which is a legal question whether an offence be undetermined? Whatsoever transgression be committed not knowingly, not consciously, not deliberately, this is called a legal question whether an offence be undetermined.
14.11 'Legal questions of business. Right. Wrong. Undetermined.'
[It maybe all three, according as the Bhikkhus performing the business specified, as in § 2, are right-minded, wrong-minded, or of undetermined mind. The form of the paragraph as in § 8 throughout.]
14.12 'Disputes, legal questions arising out of disputes. Dispute which is no legal question. Legal question which is no dispute. Matter which is both legal question and dispute.
'There may be a dispute which is a legal question of dispute. There may be a dispute which is no legal question. There may be such a legal question which is no dispute. There may be such a legal question and also a dispute.
Of these, which is the dispute which is a legal question of dispute requiring formal settlement? In case Bhikkhus discuss, saying, "This is Dhamma" [&c., as before, in § 2], or "This is not a most grave offence." Whatsoever quarrel, strife [&c., as in § 2] there may be on such a matter is a dispute which is a legal question of dispute requiring formal settlement.
[43] 'And of these, which is a dispute which is not a legal question requiring formal settlement? When a mother disputes with her son, or a son with his mother, or a father with his son, or a son with his father, or a brother with a brother, or a brother with a sister, or a sister with a brother, or a friend with a friend. Such a dispute is not a legal question requiring formal settlement by the Saṅgha.
'And of these, which is a legal question that is not a dispute? A legal question of censure, or a legal question of offence, or a legal question of business. This is a legal question which is not a dispute.
'And of these, which is a legal question requiring formal settlement which is also a dispute? A legal question of dispute that requires formal settlement by the Saṅgha is both such a legal question and also a dispute.'
14.13 [The same distinction drawn between censure, and a legal question of censure requiring formal settlement.]
14.14 'Offence. Legal question arising out of an offence. Offence which is not subject of a legal question. Legal question and no offence. Legal question and offence too.
'There may be an offence which is subject of a legal question of offence. There may be an offence and no legal question. There may be legal question and no offence. There may be legal question and offence too.
Of these, which is the offence which may be subject of a legal question? The five groups of offences are subjects of legal questions of offence; the seven groups of offences are subjects of legal questions of offence. These are offences which may be subject of a legal question.
[44] And of these, which is an offence (Âpatti) which is not subject of a legal question? Conversion, higher attainment (sot-āpatti, sam-āpatti), these are āpattis which are not subjects of a legal question[82]. These are āpattis not subjects of a legal question.
'And of these, what is the legal question where there is no offence? A legal question of official duty, a legal question of censure, a legal question of dispute. These are legal questions where there may be no offence.
'And of these, which is the case in which there is both a legal question and an offence too? A legal question regarding an offence is a case in which there is both a legal question and an offence too.
14.15 'Official duty which is subject of a legal question of business. Duty and no legal question. Legal question and no duty. Legal question and duty too.
'There may be [each of these four].
'Of these, which is official duty which is subject of a legal question? Whatsoever is to the Saṅgha a thing which ought to be done, an obligation, a matter for which leave ought to be formally asked, the proposal of a resolution, the proceeding by ñatti-dutiya-kamma, or by ñatti-katuttha-kamma, that is official duty which may be the subject of a legal question of business.
[45] 'And of these, which is the official duty which is not subject of legal question? The duties of an ākariya, of an upagghāya, of a fellow pupil under the same upagghāya or ākariya, that is business, but not subject of a legal question of business.
'And of these, which is a legal question but not official duty? A legal question arising out of dispute, a legal question arising out of censure, a legal question arising out of offence. This is a legal question of business, but not official duty.
'And of these, which is both legal question and official duty too? A legal question arising out of official business is both legal question of business and official duty too[83].
14.16 'But by what kind of settlements is a legal question arising out of dispute brought to settlement? By two kinds of settlement, by the Proceeding in presence[84], and by the Proceeding by majority of the Saṅgha[85].
'If one should ask, "Can it be that a legal question arising out of dispute without recourse having been had to the one mode of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding by majority of the Saṅgha--can it be that it may be settled by the other mode of settlement, to wit, by the Proceeding in presence?" He should be told "Yes, it can." (If he should say), "How may that be?" the answer should be as follows: "In [46] the case when the Bhikkhus dispute, saying, 'This is the Dhamma,' or 'This is not the Dhamma' (&c., as before, in § 2, down to), or 'This is not a most grave offence.'" If, O Bhikkhus, those Bhikkhus, are able to settle their own dispute, that is called, O Bhikkhus, the settlement of the dispute.
'[86]And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in presence.
'And what must there be in such a Proceeding in presence? There must be the presence of the Saṅgha, the presence of the Dhamma, the presence of the Vinaya, and the presence of the particular person.
'And therein, what is the presence of the Saṅgha? As many Bhikkhus as are capable of taking part in the proceeding[87], they must be present. The formal consent must be produced of those who are in a fit state to convey their consent[88]. Those who are present must have lodged no objection (against any one of them taking part in the proceeding)[89]. This is the "presence" in such a matter of the Saṅgha.
'And of these, what is the presence of the Dhamma, and the presence of the Vinaya? The Dhamma, and the Vinaya, and the teaching of the Master by the aid of which that legal question is settled. That is the "presence" in such a matter of the Dhamma, and of the Vinaya.
'And of these, what is the presence of the particular[47] person? He who disputes, and he with whom he disputes--both friends and foes--must be present. That is the "presence" in such a matter of the particular person.
'When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has beer. thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening of the question is a Pākittiya[90]. If one who has conveyed his consent complain of the decision, such complaint is a Pākittiya[91].
14.17 'If those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, are not able to settle the legal question within their own residence (Âvāsa), those Bhikkhus should go, O Bhikkhus, to some residence in which there are a larger number of Bhikkhus. Then if those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, should succeed, whilst on their way to that residence, in settling the legal question, that, O Bhikkhus, is called a settlement of it. And how has it been settled? (&c., as in the last paragraph of the previous section, down to the end.)
14.18 'If those Bhikkhus are not able, O Bhikkhus, to settle the legal question whilst they are on their way to that residence, then those Bhikkhus, on their arrival at that residence, are to address the Bhikkhus at that residence thus: "Such and such a legal question, Sirs, has arisen thus, and has been carried on thus amongst us. It would be well if you, Sirs, would settle that legal question for us according to the Dhamma, and according to the Vinaya, and according to the teaching of the Master, to the end that that legal question may be thoroughly settled." If the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence [48] are the senior, and the incoming Bhikkhus are junior, then the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence are, O Bhikkhus, to address the incoming Bhikkhus thus: "Pray, Sirs, rest a moment apart until we take counsel together!" If, on the other hand, the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence are junior, and the incoming Bhikkhus are senior, then the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence are, O Bhikkhus, to address the incoming Bhikkhus thus: "Then remain here, Sirs, a moment until we take counsel together." Then if, O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence should, on consideration, think thus: "We shall not be able to settle this legal question according to the Dhamma, and according to the Vinaya, and according to the teaching of the Master," then that dispute is not to be entrusted to them. If, on the other hand, O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence should, on consideration, think thus: "We shall be able to settle this legal question in accordance with the Dhamma, and in accordance with the Vinaya, and in accordance with the teaching of the Master," then, O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence are to address the incoming Bhikkhus thus: "If you, Sirs, let us know about this legal question, how it arose, and how it was carried on, and if you agree that in the manner in which we may settle the legal question according to the Dhamma, and according to the Vinaya, and according to the teaching of the Master, in that manner it shall be settled, then we will thus accept the legal question at your hands. But if not (&c., the whole being repeated), then we will not accept it." When they have thus, O Bhikkhus, brought [49] it about that the proper way of putting the legal question (the point at issue) has been settled, the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence should undertake that legal question. And then the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence should be addressed, O Bhikkhus, by the incoming Bhikkhus thus: "We inform you, Sirs, how this legal question arose and how it was carried on. If you, Sirs, are able in such and such a time[92] to settle this legal question according to the Dhamma, and according to the Vinaya, and according to the teaching of the Master, then will we entrust this legal question to you. But if you, Sirs, should not be able to do so, then will we ourselves retain the custody of the case." Thus, O Bhikkhus, is that legal question to be entrusted by the incoming Bhikkhus to the Bhikkhus dwelling in that residence, causing them duly to accept it. If those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, are able to settle the case, that, O Bhikkhus, is called a settlement of the legal question. And how has it been settled? (&c., as in last paragraph of § 16, down to the end.)
14.19 'If, O Bhikkhus, whilst the case is being enquired into by those Bhikkhus, pointless speeches are brought forth, and the sense of any single utterance is not clear[93], I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle the case by referring it (to a jury or commission)[94].
[50] 'A Bhikkhu to be chosen on such a jury must be possessed of ten qualities--he must be virtuous--he must be living enclosed by the restraint of the rules of the Pātimokkha--he must be upright in life, trained according to the precepts, taking them upon himself with a sense of the danger in the least offence[95]--he must be versed in the tradition, a custodian of the tradition, a storehouse of the tradition--whatsoever truths, lovely in their origin, lovely in their progress, lovely in their consummation, set forth the higher life, both in its spirit and in its letter, in all its purity and in all its perfectness[96], in such truths must he be well versed, of such must he be full, they must be laid up in his words[97], and dwelt on in his heart, being penetrated throughout through right insight[98]--both the Pātimokkhas must have [51] been completely handed down to him in their full extent, he must have well divided them, well established them, well investigated them, both sutta by sutta and in every detail[99]--further he must be an expert in the Vinaya, irrefutable therein[100]--he must be competent to point out (the right course) to both friends and foes, to get them to understand a thing, get them to see it and recognise it[101], able to pacify them--he must be clever (in judging) both as to the origin and as to the settlement of disputes--he must understand legal questions, the origin thereof, the close thereof, and the way that leads to the close thereof.
'I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to appoint on the jury a Bhikkhu possessed of these ten qualities[102].
14.20 'And thus, O Bhikkhus, is he to be appointed. First, the Bhikkhu should be asked (whether he be willing to undertake the office). Then some discreet and able Bhikkhu should address the Saṅgha thus:
'"May the venerable Saṅgha hear me. Whilst this case was being enquired into pointless speeches were brought forth amongst us, and the sense of no single utterance was clear. If the time seems meet [52] to the venerable Saṅgha, let it appoint Bhikkhus of such and such a name, and of such and such a name on a committee. This is the motion.
'"Let the venerable Saṅgha hear me. Whilst (&c., . . . down to) no single utterance was clear.
The Saṅgha appoints Bhikkhus of such and such names on a committee to settle this case. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves of the appointment of such and such Bhikkhus on the committee for the settlement of this case, let him be silent. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak.
'"Such and such a Bhikkhu is appointed by the Saṅgha on the committee for the settlement of this case. Therefore is it silent. Thus do I understand."
14.21 'If then, O Bhikkhus, those Bhikkhus are able on the reference (or on the committee) to settle the case, that, O Bhikkhus, is called a case that is settled. And how is it settled? By the Proceeding in Presence[103]. And what therein is meant by the Proceeding in Presence? The Dhamma is represented, and the Vinaya is represented, and the particular person is represented[104].
'And of these, what is the presence of the Dhamma (&c., as in § 16, down to the end).
'If a dispute, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pākittiya[105].
14.22 'If, O Bhikkhus, whilst the case is being [53] enquired into by those Bhikkhus, there should be there a Bhikkhu who is a preacher of the Dhamma, but neither has the Sutta[106] been handed down to him nor the Sutta-vibhaṅga, and he not regarding the point of the case, reject the sense for the shadow of the letter, then should the matter be laid before those Bhikkhus by some discreet and able Bhikkhu thus:
'"Let the venerable ones hear me. This Bhikkhu of such and such a name is a preacher of the Dhamma, but neither has the Sutta been handed down to him nor the Sutta-vibhaṅga. And he, not regarding the point of the case, is rejecting the sense for the shadow of the letter. If the time seems meet to the venerable ones, let them send away[107] the Bhikkhu of such and such a name, and let the rest of us settle this case."
'If those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, should be able, after having sent away that Bhikkhu, to settle the case, that is called a case that is settled. And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence (&c., as in last section, down to the end).'
14.23 (The same decision if the Sutta has been handed down to him, but not the Sutta-vibhaṅga.)
14.24 'If those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, are not able by the committee to settle that case, those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, ought to hand over the case to the Saṅgha, saying, "We, Sirs, are not able by a committee to settle this case, let the Saṅgha settle it." I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle such a case by vote of the majority (&c., as in chapter 9 to the [54] end, as to the appointment of a taker of the voting tickets). By that Bhikkhu, the taker of the voting tickets, are the votes to be collected. And according as the larger number of Bhikkhus who are guided by the Dhamma shall speak, so shall the case be decided. This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled.
'And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence and by the vote of the majority. And what herein is meant by Proceeding in Presence? The presence of the Saṅgha, and the presence of the Dhamma, and the presence of the Vinaya, and the presence of the particular person. And of these, what is the presence of the Saṅgha? (&c., as in § 16, down to) That is the presence in such a matter of the particular person.
'And what herein is meant by the vote of the majority? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification by the official act (the Kamma) by the vote of the majority[108]. That is what is meant herein by the vote of the majority.
'When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pākittiya. If one who has conveyed his consent complain of the decision, such complaint is a Pākittiya[109].'
14.25 Now at that time a certain legal question had arisen in such and such a manner, and had grown up in such and such a manner at Sāvatthi. And those [55] Bhikkhus were discontented with the settlement of the case by the Saṅgha at Sāvatthi. And they heard that in a certain residence there were dwelling a number of Theras versed in the traditions; men to whom the Agamas[110] had been handed down; reciters of the Dhamma, of the Vinaya, and of the Mātikās[111], learned, discreet, wise, modest, conscientious, anxious to learn. And they thought, 'If those Theras would settle this case according to the Dhamma, and according to the Vinaya, and according to the teaching of the Master, then would this case be indeed well settled.' So those Bhikkhus went to that residence, and spake to those Theras thus: 'This legal question, Sirs, has arisen in such and such a manner, and has grown up in such and such a manner. It would be well if the venerable Theras would settle the case according to the Dhamma, and according to the Vinaya, and according to the teaching of the Master!' Then those Theras, saying, 'Even as the case has been settled by the Saṅgha at Sāvatthi, so is it well settled!' decided the case in the same way. Then those Bhikkhus who had been discontented with the decision of the Saṅgha at Sāvatthi were discontented with the decision of the number of Theras.
[The paragraph is repeated with the necessary alterations of consecutive applications to three, two and one Thera with the same result.]
Then those Bhikkhus, discontented with the decision of the Saṅgha at Sāvatthi, discontented with the decision of the number of Theras, discontented [56] with the decision of the three Theras, discontented with the decision of the two Theras, discontented with the decision of the single Thera, went up to the place where the Blessed One was, and told the matter to the Blessed One.
This case, O Bhikkhus, is done with; having been once settled, it is settled for good.
14.26[112]. 'I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, three ways of taking votes, in order to appease such Bhikkhus[113]--the secret method, the whispering method, and the open method.
'And how, O Bhikkhus, is the secret method of taking votes? The Bhikkhu who is the teller of the votes is to make the voting tickets of different colours, and as each Bhikkhu comes up to him he is to say to him thus: "This is the ticket for the man of such an opinion; this the ticket for the man of such an opinion. Take whichever you like." When he has chosen (he is to add), "Don't show it to anybody." If he ascertains that those whose opinion is against the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to reject the vote as wrongly taken. If he ascertains that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to report the vote as well taken. This, O Bhikkhus, is the secret method of taking the votes.
'And how, O Bhikkhus, is the whispering method of taking votes? The Bhikkhu who is the teller of the votes is to whisper in each Bhikkhu's ear, "This is the ticket of those of such an opinion; this is the ticket of those of such an opinion. Take whichever [57] you like." When he has chosen (he is to add), "Don't tell anybody (which way you have voted)." If he ascertains that those whose opinion is against the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to reject the vote as wrongly taken. If he ascertains that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to report the vote as well taken. Thus, O Bhikkhus, is the whispering method of taking the votes.
And how, O Bhikkhus, is the open method of taking votes? If he ascertains (beforehand) that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, the vote is to be taken undisguisedly, openly. Thus, O Bhikkhus, is the open method of taking the votes.
'These, O Bhikkhus, are the three methods of taking the votes[114].'
14.27 'By how many kinds of settlement is a legal question arising out of censure settled? A legal question arising out of censure can be settled by four kinds of settlement--by the Proceeding in Presence--by the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent-by the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind--by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate.
'If one should ask, "Can it be that a legal question arising out of censure, without recourse being had to two modes of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind, and the [58] Proceeding for those who are obstinate--may be settled by the two other modes of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent?" he should be told, "Yes, it can." (If he should say), "How may that be?" the answer should be as follows:
'In case the Bhikkhus bring a groundless charge against a Bhikkhu of a breach of morality. In respect thereof, O Bhikkhus, to that Bhikkhu whose memory in regard to the matter is quite clear, the Proceeding for the consciously innocent is to be accorded.
'And thus, O Bhikkhus, is to be granted (&c., as in chapter 4, § 10, down to the end, with the necessary alterations for a general rule instead of a particular case).
'This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding for the consciously innocent. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence? The presence of the Saṅgha, and the presence of the Dhamma, and the presence of the Vinaya, and the presence of the particular person. And therein what is the presence of the Saṅgha (&c., as in § 16, down to the end)? And what therein belongs to the Proceeding for the consciously innocent? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of; the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the Proceeding for the consciously innocent[115]. That is what belongs herein to the Proceeding for the consciously innocent.'
[59] 14.28 [This section bears exactly the same relation to chapter 5 as the last section does to chapter 4, the form of the two sections being exactly the same throughout.]
29[116]. 'If one should ask, "Can it be that a legal question arising out of censure, without recourse being had to two modes of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent, and the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind--may be settled by the two other modes of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding for those who are obstinate?" he should be told, "Yes, it can." If he should say, "How may that be?" the answer should be as follows:
'In case a Bhikkhu warn another Bhikkhu in the midst of the Saṅgha of a grievous offence, and call upon him to recollect (whether he have. committed it or not), saying, "Has the venerable one been guilty of such and such a grievous offence--a Pārāgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Pārāgika offence?" And he replies thus, "I do not, Sir, call to mind that I have been guilty of such and such a grievous offence--a Pārāgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Pārāgika offence." To him thus denying the other insists, saying, "Come now, Sir, ascertain for certain whether you are conscious of having been guilty of such and such a grievous [60] offence--a Pārāgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Pārāgika offence." And he replies thus: "I do not, Sir, call to mind that I have been guilty of such and such a grievous offence--a Pārāgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Pārāgika offence. But I do, Sir, recollect that I was guilty of such and such a trifling offence." To him thus denying the other insists [as before]. And he replies thus: "Seeing that I am willing, Sir, though you did not ask me, to confess myself guilty of that trifling offence, why should I not confess, when asked, such and such a grievous offence--a Pārāgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Pārāgika offence?" And the other rejoins, "But you do not confess, Sir, even that trifling offence without being asked. How should you confess, if you were not asked, the commission of such and such a grievous offence--a Pārāgika offence, or one equivalent to a Pārāgika offence? Come now, Sir, ascertain for certain whether you are conscious of having been guilty of such and such a grievous offence--a Pārāgika offence, or one equivalent to .a. Pārāgika offence?" And he replies, "Yes, I am conscious, Sir, of having committed such and such an offence--a Pārāgika offence, or one equivalent to a Pārāgika offence. In sport did I say, in fun did I say that I was not conscious thereof"
'Then, O Bhikkhus, the Proceeding for those who are obstinate should be carried out against that Bhikkhu.
'And thus should it be carried out (&c., as chapter 11, § 2, down to the end, reading "such and such a Bhikkhu" for "Upavāla," and "grievous offence" for "offence ").
[61] 'This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence? The Presence of the Saṅgha (&c., as in § 16). And what therein belongs to the Proceeding for those who are obstinate? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the official act (the Kamma) by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. That is what belongs therein to the Proceeding for those who are obstinate.
'When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pākittiya. If one who has conveyed his consent complain of the decision, such complaint is a Pākittiya.
14.30 'By how many modes of settlement is a legal question arising out of offence settled? A legal question arising out of offence is settled by three modes of settlement--to wit, by the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding on confession of guilt, and by the Proceeding by covering over as with grass.
'If one should ask, "Can it be that a legal question arising out of offence, without recourse being had to the one mode of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding by covering over as with grass--may be settled by the other two modes--to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding on confession of guilt?" he should be told, "Yes, it can." If he should say, "How may that be?" the answer should be as follows:
[62] 'In case a Bhikkhu has been guilty of a minor offence. That Bhikkhu, O Bhikkhus, should go up to another Bhikkhu, and having arranged his upper robe over one shoulder, and squatted down on his heels, and stretched forth his hands with the palms held together, should speak as follows: "I, Sir, have been guilty of such and such an offence; and that I confess." He should say, "Do you acknowledge it?" "Yes; I acknowledge it." "May you restrain yourself in future[117]!"
'This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question which has been settled. And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding on confession of guilt. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence? The presence of the Dhamma, and the presence of the Vinaya, and the presence of the particular individual. And what therein is the presence of the Dhamma, and of the Vinaya? The Dhamma, and the Vinaya, and the teaching of the Master, by the aid of which that legal question is settled. That is the presence in such a matter of the Dhamma, and of the Vinaya. And what therein is the presence of the particular individual? He who confesses, and he to whom he confesses, both are present. That is the presence of the particular individual in such a proceeding. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding on confession of guilt? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the performance of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the official act (the Kamma) by the Proceeding on confession of [63] guilt. That is what belongs therein to the Proceeding on confession of guilt.
'When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pākittiya[118].
14.31 'If he should thus receive (absolution), it is well. If he should not receive it, that Bhikkhu, O Bhikkhus, should go up to a number of Bhikkhus, and having arranged his upper robe over one shoulder, and bowed down before the elder Bhikkhus, and squatted down on his heels, and stretched forth his two hands with the palms held together, he should speak as follows: "I, Sirs, have been guilty of such and such an offence, and that I confess." Then some discreet and able Bhikkhu should lay the matter before those Bhikkhus, saying, "Let the venerable ones hear me. This Bhikkhu, of such and such a name, is conscious of an offence; and he discloses it, reveals it, confesses it. If the time seems meet to the venerable ones, I would absolve[119] that Bhikkhu's offence." And he should say, "Do you acknowledge it?" "Yes; I acknowledge it." "In future may you restrain yourself!"
This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question which has been settled. And how has it been settled? (&c., as in last section, down to the end.)
14.32 'If he should thus receive absolution, it is well. If he should not receive it, that Bhikkhu, O Bhikkhus, should go before the Saṅgha (&c., as in last section, down to the end, then adding): And if one who has given his consent to the proceeding [64] thereafter make complaint thereof, that is a Pākittiya.
14.33 'If one should ask, "Can it be that a legal question arising out of offence, without recourse being had to the one mode of settlement--to wit, the Proceeding on confession of guilt--may be settled by the other two modes--to wit, by the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding by covering over as with grass?" he should be told, "Yes, it can." If he should say, "How may that be?" the answer should be as follows:
'If while the Bhikkhus are continuing in quarrels (&c., as in chapter 13, §§ 1, 2, and 3, down to the end).
'This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding by the covering over as with grass.
'And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence? The presence (&c., as in § 16, down to) And what therein is the presence of the particular person? He who confesses, and he to whom the confession is made[120], both are present. This is the presence of the particular individual in such a case.
'And what therein belongs to the Proceeding by covering over as with grass? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the performance of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the official act (the Kamma) by the Proceeding by covering over as with grass. That is what belongs therein to the Proceeding by covering over as with grass.
[65] 'When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pākittiya. If one who has conveyed his consent complain of the decision, such complaint is a Pākittiya.
34. 'By how many modes of settlement is a legal question arising out of business settled? A legal question arising out of business is settled by one mode of settlement only--to wit, by the Proceeding in Presence.'
End of the Fourth Khandhaka, on the Settlement of Legal Questions.
[1] The words above are repeated.
[2] This short enumeration of the different categories occurring in the subsequent paragraphs is quite in the style of the Abhidhamma texts, in which such lists are accustomed to be called mātikā; compare the expression mātikā-dharo as applied to a learned Bhikkhu in the stock phrase at Mahāvagga X, 2, 1; Kullavagga I, 11; IV, 14, 25, &c.
[3] The Samanta Pāsādikā here says: nigghāpetîti yathā so tam attham nigghāyati oloketi evam karoti.
[4] Pekkheti anupekkhetîti yathā so tam attham pekkhati k’ eva punappunañ ka pekkhati evam karoti. (Samanta Pāsādikā.)
[5] Sammukhā-vinaya-patirûpakena. The rule of procedure, called Sammukhā-vinaya, hereafter rendered 'Proceeding in Presence,' is one of the seven modes of settling disputes already. referred to in the closing chapter of the Pātimokkha ('Vinaya Texts,' vol. 1, p. 68), and is more fully described below in Kullavagga IV, 14, 16, and following sections.
It will be seen below, from §§ IV, 14, 27-30, that it is involved in, or rather is supposed to accompany, each of the other Proceedings mentioned in this chapter.
[6] The whole of the following story of Dabba down to the end of section 9 (except the last sentence) recurs in the Sutta-vibhaṅga as the Introductory Story to the Eighth Samghādisesa. The Samanta Pāsādikā has therefore no commentary upon it here, and the few extracts that we give from it are taken from the notes of that work on the corresponding passage in the Sutta-vibhaṅga. The stupidity of Udāyi, who once supplanted Dabba the Mallian in the performance of his duty as bhattuddesaka, forms the burthen of the Introductory Story to the Gātaka on 'the Measure of Rice' (No. 5 in the Gātaka book; 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' pp. 172 and following).
[7] On this phrase compare Mahāvagga V, 1, 21, and the verses at V, 1, 27.
[8] Ghāyino possibly used with the technical connotation of, being addicted to the practice of the Four Ghāna meditations; but compare Mahāvagga I, 1, 3, 5, 7.
[9] See the comment as quoted by H.O.
[10] Compare the use of tegodhātum samāpaggitvā at Mahāvagga I, 15, 4.
[11] Compare api ssu at Kullavagga I, 9, 1.
[12] That paribhoganiyam does not mean drinking-water, as Childers renders it, is clear from VIII, 1, 2, where it is implied that it is to be used for washing feet. Our translation of Mahāvagga II, 20, 5 should be corrected accordingly.
[13] Compare below, VIII, 6, 3.
[14] Katika-santhānam. Compare Gātaka I, 81, and Mahāvagga VIII, 32, and Kullavagga VIII, 1, 2.
[15] That this is the correct rendering of this otherwise doubtful passage is clear from the closing words of VIII, 1, 2, where most of these phrases recur. In the text, for the last word nikkhipitabbam read nikkhamitabbam, as pointed out in the note at p. 363 of the edition of the text.
[16] These were two of the six leaders of the notorious Khabbaggiya Bhikkhus.
[17] Compare the 22nd Nissaggiya.
[18] Abhisamkhārikam; that is, a gift by the giving of which the donor expressly wished that a particular result (as, for stance, that the donor should be re-born as a king or queen, or should enter the paths, or have opportunity to hear a Buddha preach) should be brought about by the normal effect of that good act in a future birth. There are not a few instances of such wishes, and of their fulfilment, recorded in various parts of the sacred literature.
[19] Uttaribhaṅgam. See the passages quoted in the note on Mahāvagga VI, 14, 3. These three things are also mentioned together at VIII, 4, 4.
[20] These expressions recur at Gātaka I, 228. The Samanta Pāsādikā says merely kanāgakan ti sakuntaka-bhattam. Bilaṅgadutiyan ti kañgika-dutiyam.
[21] The Samanta Pāsādikā says simply kalyānam bhattam assā ti kalyāna-bhattiko.
[22] Kotthake, which means the battlemented gateway which formed the entrance to an important house; and in which there was a room. See Gātaka I, 227.
[23] Samghāti-pallatthikāya. There is a misprint in the text (°ttikāya). On this curious expression, see below, V, 28, 2.
[24] Pattakkhandhā, which the Samanta Pāsādikā explains by patitakkhandhā. Khandhā here seems to mean 'faculties.' Compare the use of Dhammā in a similar connection at Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta II, 32 = Mahāvagga V, 13, 9; and see Buddhaghosa's commentary on that passage, quoted by Rh. D. in 'Buddhist Suttas from the Pāli,' p. 36.
[25] Appatibhānā. Patibhānam is the rapid suggestion of an idea in a case of doubt or difficulty, an illumination; so that patibhānako, the man of ready wit, may be compared with upāya-kusalo, the man fertile in resource. 'Absent-minded' would be an incorrect rendering; they had no idea what to think or do, and the appearance of the nun on the scene (in the next paragraph) supplied the want. Till then they hesitated, drifted.
[26] The following narrative, down to § 9, is repeated almost word for word in V, 20, only that the person there persuaded to bring the false accusation is different.
[27] Agghupekkhati. Compare Gātaka I, 147.
[28] Literally, 'Do you recollect?' But it is quite clear from the technical words at the close of this section that the verb sarati had already acquired the secondary meaning 'to be conscious of.' The whole story is peculiarly valuable as illustrating the growth of the connotation of the verb and its allied meanings, and indirectly the origin and growth of the idea of 'conscience' which has played so great a part in theological and ethical speculation.
[29] That is, 'Men of character and standing such as yours, O Dabba, are not in the habit of repudiating a charge in so indirect a manner by adverting merely to their standing and known character.'
[30] Here the word used is abhigānāmi.
[31] Dabbassa sati-vepulla-ppattassa sati-vinayam detu. The explanation of the compound sati-vepulla-ppatto given by Childers, though it rests on so good an authority as that of Vigesimha Mudaliar, cannot be right. He makes it mean 'a man of great intellectual development.' But sati must here refer to the fact that Dabba has been formally called upon to remember (sarîto) whether he did or did not commit the offence. And though the exact sense of the compound is subject to some doubt, the general sense of the clause must be very much as we have conjecturally rendered it. On this formal appeal to the conscience, or memory (sati), of a Bhikkhu charged with an offence, or supposed to have offended, see Kullavagga I, 2, and 5 at the end; and X, 20.
[32] Ukkutikam nisîditvā. This verb does not mean 'to sit on the hams,' as rendered by Childers. The exact posture, unknown in Europe, is to crouch down on the feet (keeping both toes and heels on the ground) in such a way that the hams do not touch the ground, but come within an inch or two of it. Europeans find it very difficult to retain this posture for any length of time, but the natives of India find it easy, and it is regarded in the Pitakas as a posture of humility.
[33] This section is repeated below, chap. 14, § 27, with the necessary alterations for a general rule instead of a particular case.
[34] The particular decision given in this chapter for the particular case is elaborated in chap. 14, § 28 below into a general rule for every similar case.
[35] Buddhaghosa explains this word as follows: 'Bhāsitaparikantan ti vikāya bhāsitam kāyena parikkantam parikkametvā katan ti attho.' The similar word Parikantam, which occurs in the Sutta-vibhaṅga, Pārāgika IV, 1, 2, in the sense of lacerated, is from the root krint.
[36] Nam in the text is correct. It is identical with the nam so frequently found in Jain Prakrit; on which see Weber in his Bhagavatî 'Abhandlungen der Berliner Akadamie,' 1865, pp. 422 and foll.
[37] Ummattakālayam karoti, on which Buddhaghosa says nothing. The word recurs in the following section.
[38] The mode in which such a confession ought to be made is set out in full in IV, 14, 30-34.
[39] The same, namely, as those in the list given at Mahāvagga IV, 16, 12, &c.
[40] In other words, if a Bhikkhu confesses an offence different from that with which he has been charged, the confession cannot be used against him even as regards a decision with respect to the offence confessed.
[41] On this chapter, see further below, IV, 14, 16.
[42] Aññamaññam mukhaisattîhi vitudantā viharanti. Literally, 'with mouth-javelins.' Vitudati, and not vitûdati as Childers gives, is the right spelling. So Fausböll reads at Gātaka II, 185, 186.
[43] From here to the end of the chapter recurs in IV, 14, 24.
[44] These are the qualifications always ascribed to one who rightly fills any judicial offence, and are called the four Agatis. They are the especial attributes of a good king sitting as judge, and are mentioned elsewhere (Samghādisesa XIII; Mahāvagga VIII, 5, 2; VIII, 6, 1; and below, VI, 11, 2) of other officials of the order with duties similar to those in the text.
[45] On this chapter, see further below, IV, 14, 24-26.
[46] Oramattakam. Compare the English law maxim, De minimis non curat lex.
[47] Buddhaghosa says, Na ka gatigatan ti dve tayo āvāse na gatam, tattha tatth’ eva vā dvitikkhattum avinikkhitam. See on these proceedings above.
[48] Buddhaghosa says, Na ka sarita-sāritan ti dvitikkhattum tehi bhikkhûhi sayam saritam va aññehi sāritam vā na hoti.
[49] Gānātî ti salākam gāhento gānāti. (S.P.)
[50] App eva nāma. That this phrase does not merely mean 'perhaps' is clear from its use in § 2.
[51] Adhammena ganhantî ti adhammavādino evam mayam bahû bhavissāmā ti dve dve salākāyo ganhanti. (S.P.)
[52] On vaggā, here = vi + agga, compare our note on the 21st Pākittiya, and Kullavagga I, 2, 1. Buddhaghosa here says, Vaggā ganhantî ti dve dhammavādino ekam dhammavādisalākam ganhanti evam dhammavādino na bahû bhavissanti ti maññamānā.
[53] With this chapter the 26th section of chapter 14 should be compared, where very curious means are inculcated for avoiding some of the votes here stated to be invalid.
[54] In the Burmese MSS. the name of this monk is written Upavāla.
[55] Aññena aññam patikarati. We follow Wijesimha Mudaliyar's interpretation of this phrase as given by Childers (s.v. tassapāpiyyasikā).
[56] Chapter 14, section 29 below, is in fact an elaboration of this paragraph, giving instances of the kind of prevarication here intended to be referred to.
[57] The exact meaning of the phrase is somewhat doubtful, owing to the ambiguity of the tassa. It should probably be analysed 'the proceeding against one who is more sinful (pāpiyo) than that (tassa);' that is, who adds sin to sin. Childers gives a long note on the Proceeding drawn by Wijesimha Mudaliyar from this chapter, but does not analyse the word.
[58] This Kammavākā is precisely the same as is laid down in Kullavagga I, 1, 4, &c. in the case of all the other penal Kammas.
[59] Compare the use of anuvādo in Kullavagga I, 5.
[60] These paragraphs exactly correspond to paragraphs at Kullavagga I, 2. It is probably merely owing to this repetition that it is here also prescribed that the accused person must confess himself guilty, as it must be evident from the Introductory Story, that he will not do so.
[61] The whole of this chapter recurs below, IV, 14, 33.
[62] Buddhaghosa's commentary on this expression will be found in the notes to H.O.'s edition of the text, pp. 313, 314.
[63] Buddhaghosa (H.O. loc. cit.) explains this as meaning either Pārāgika or Samghādisesa offences. So also he explains Dutthullā āpatti at Mahāvagga X, 5, 4.
[64] Deseyyam. Compare IV, 14, 33, at the end.
[65] On these phrases Buddhaghosa has the following note Ditthāvikamman ti ye pana na me tam khamatî ti aññamaññā ditthāvikammam karonti tehi vā saddhim āpattim āpaggitvā pi, tattha anāgatā āgantvā vā khandam datvā parivenādisu nisinnā, te āpattîhi na vutthahanti. This is more an exegesis on the rule than an explanation of the words Ditthāvikammam thapetvā, the exact meaning of which remains doubtful. The literal rendering would be 'except as regards the manifestation of opinion.'
[66] It was with reference to this conduct of Khanna that the Buddha is stated in the Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta VI, 4 to have imposed a penalty upon him. He is also mentioned above, I, 25-31, and below, XI, 1, 12-14.
[67] Compare the 16th and 43rd Pākittiyas. Buddhaghosa says here, Bhikkhunînam anupakhaggā ti bhikkhunînam antopavisitvā.
[68] The various ways of settling these four kinds of legal questions are recapitulated in § 27-34 of this chapter.
[69] Sāvasesā-anavasesā-āpatti. The Parivara IX, 1, 10 says, Yā sā āpatti anavasesā sā āpatti na katamena adhikaranena na katamamhi thāne na katamena samathena sammati. It is practically equivalent therefore to Pārāgikā. Those offences which can be done away, but only by the Saṅgha, are called accordingly in the Buddhist Sanskrit Samghāvasesha, which corresponds to the Pāli Samghādisesa. The translation and note at Mahāvagga X, 2, 4 should be altered accordingly.
[70] Vipakkatāya vohāro ti kitta-dukkhatthāya vohāro pharusavakanan ti attho (S.P.).
[71] Anullapanā anubhananā ti ubhayam anuvadana-vevakanamattam eva (S.P.).
[72] Anusampavaṅkatā ti punappunam kāya-kittam vākāhi tatth’ eva sampavaṅkatā anuvadanabhāvo ti attho (S.P.).
[73] Abbhussahanatā ti kasmā evam na upavadissāmi upavadissāmi yevā ti ussāham katvā anuvadanā (S.P.).
[74] That is to say, Pārāgika, Samghādisesa, Pākittiya, Pātidesaniya, and Dukkata, as below, in IV, 14, 14; IX, 3, 3.
[75] That is to say, the five mentioned in the last note, and besides them, Thullakkaya and Dubbhāsita.
[76] Apalokana-kamman ti-ādi pana tass’ eva pabheda-vakanam. Tattha apalokana-kammam nāma sîmatthakam samgham sodhetvā khandārahānam khandam āharitvā samaggassa anumatiyā tikkhattum sāvetvā kātabba-kammam (S.P.).
[77] See our note at Mahāvagga I, 28, 3. The Samanta Pāsādikā here says, ñattidutiyakammam pana apaloketvā kattabbam pi atthi akattabbam pi atthi. Tattha sîmasammuti simasamûhananā kathinadānam kathinubbhāro kûtavatthudesanā vihāravatthudesanā ’ti imāni kha kammāni garukāni apaloketvā kātum na vattati, ñattidutiyakammavākam sāvetvā ’va kātabbāni, avasesā terasa sammutiyo senāsanagāhakamataka (? patta) kîvaradānāti(°di?)-sammutiyo kā ’ti evarûpāni lahukakammāni apaloketvā pi kātum vattanti.
[78] Palāsî; no doubt connected with the primary meaning of the word 'leaf,' as is also its use in the sense of 'covering, lining,' in eka-palāsikā upāhanā at Mahāvagga V, 1, 29. The expression forms the subject of Puggala II, 2. See also Gātaka III, 259.
[79] Buddhaghosa has no explanation of these terms here, but on Aṅguttara Nikāya III, 2, 3, where the whole list recurs, he says (as Dr. Morris is good enough to inform us) that okotimako is equal to lakuntako; and the same explanation is given by the commentary on Puggala IV, 19. Compare the use in English of 'a mere dot of a man,' in a similar sense.
[80] These three epithets of the voice are no doubt intended to be the opposites of the three in Mahāvagga V, 13.'9.
[81] We have already pointed out (above, IV, 1, 2) that this mode of the commencement of a discussion by setting out a list of the points to be discussed and compared is found also in some of the Abhidhamma books. There it was only the objects themselves, here we have all the predicates which it is proposed to apply (as in § 8), or to declare inapplicable to the object (as in § 10), which are set out, but the principle is the same.
[82] This is merely a play upon words. Âpatti is literally 'attainment to.' Standing alone it is always used with the connotation of 'attainment to guilt, sin, offence,' so that its etymological meaning is always lost sight of. Sotāpatti is the 'attainment to,' the 'entering upon' the stream, that is, the course of the Excellent Way. The Sam āpatti s, literally, 'complete, or higher, attainments,' are eight successive states of ecstatic insight or meditation practised by Arahats and other men of advanced spiritual culture. The question stated is in fact a riddle, like so many of the questions stated in the Parivāra and the Puggala-paññatti.
[83] Here again the whole section depends upon a play upon the various meanings of the word kikkam. In the technical phrase kikkādhikaranam, the word means solely the business or the agenda at the formal meetings of the Saṅgha (compare above, § 7). In the problems or riddles of this section its more common meaning of 'duty' is brought into play.
[84] Sammukhā-vinayena. See above, chapter 2.
[85] Yebhuyyasikena. See above, chapter 9.
[86] The following five paragraphs recur in IV, 14, §§ 24, 27, and four of them in IV, 14, 21, 30.
[87] Kammappattā. See Parivāra XIX, 1, 7, et seq.
[88] See above, Mahāvagga II, 23.
[89] Or rather, 'perhaps, 'against the proceedings which are being carried out.'
[90] This is the 63rd Pākittiya.
[91] This is the 79th Pākittiya. The whole paragraph is repeated several times below in this chapter.
[92] Ettakena vā antarena, on which Buddhaghosa has nothing. On vā = eva, see Böhtlingk-Roth s.v. vā, No. 4.
[93] These words recur at XII, 2, 7, where an instance occurs of the mode of proceeding here laid down.
[94] Ubbāhikāya. Childers has quite misunderstood both the meaning and the derivation of this term. It must be derived from ud+vah; and means simply 'reference'--the turning over of a difficult or intricate case from the general Saṅgha to a special committee, as was done at Vesālî (below, XII, 2, 7).
[95] With this passage (so far) compare the Âkaṅkheyya Sutta, § 2 (translated in Rh. D.'s 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 210), where the wording is somewhat different. See, however, the various readings here.
[96] We prefer to translate, in accordance with IX, 5, I below, sāttham savyañganam as given in the corrections to the text on p. 303; thus making the phrase 'in the spirit and in the letter' refer to the brahma-kariyam, and not to the dhammā. But it should be pointed out that the parallel passage in the stock description of a Buddha (for instance in Tevigga Sutta I, 46, translated in Rh. D.'s 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 187) would support the reading given here in the text, referring the phrase in question to the dhammā, and not to the brahma-kariyam.
[97] See the various readings, and compare Sigālovāda Sutta, p. 301; Gātaka II, 247, 293; Mahāvagga VI, 25, I.
[98] Though ditthi is usually found in its bad sense of 'delusion' (it never means 'heresy,' as Childers renders it), it is also used, especially in older texts, in the good sense of 'insight.' Compare the 'Book of the Great Decease,' I, 11.
[99] Perhaps this may mean 'both as to the Suttas themselves and as to the Old Commentary upon them'--suttato anuvyañganaso. See 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, p. xviii, and note 2, p. xxix.
[100] Vinaye kheko hoti asamhîro. Compare on the use of these words, Gātaka I, 290; II, 161; Sutta Nipāta V, 18, 26.
[101] On all these terms, which have occurred above at IV, 2, I, see the commentary as there quoted in the notes.
[102] It is of course to be understood that the committee or jury does not consist of only one such Bhikkhu. In the instance already referred to as occurring in XII, 2, 7, four are chosen from each side.
[103] Sammukhā-vinayena. See chapter 2.
[104] This is the same as in § 16 of this chapter, except that 'the presence of the Saṅgha' is omitted.
[105] See the 63rd Pākittiya, and § 17 above.
[106] That is, the Pātimokkha.
[107] Literally, 'cause him to arise.'
[108] This sentence is also used of the other modes of settlement below, §§ 27, 29.
[109] So also above, § 16; and below, §§ 27-29.
[110] That is, the Four Nikāyas, now forming the Sutta Pitaka.
[111] See our note above on Kullavagga IV, 1, 2.
[112] On the following section, compare chapters 9 and to above.
[113] On Saññattiyā see our note below on VII, 4, I.
[114] This naive chapter would seem to show that the pia fraus was not unknown to the Buddhist monks at the time when the Kullavagga was composed. Buddhaghosa's note (given at p. 315 of H.O.'s edition of the text) specifies the different occasions when each of the three methods should be used.
[115] This clause corresponds to the one above, in §24, and below, in § 29.
[116] This section again bears exactly the same relation to chapter 11 as the previous ones have done to chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The outline of the form is the same, but as in the introductory part (containing the description of the offence) the present section is much fuller than the chapter to which it refers, 'we prefer to give that part of this section in full.
[117] Âyatim samvareyyāsi. So again in the next section. Compare V, 20, 5.
[118] See §§ 16, 29, &c. of this chapter.
[119] Patiganheyyam. See V, 20, 5.
[120] This refers to the technical term of the Proceeding in question, tinavatthārakena deseyyam (IV, 13, 2); and the singular of course includes the plural, as the confession usually took place before a number of Bhikkhus.
