Index of the Suttas of the
Saṃyutta Nikāya
Khandha Vagga,
Ditthi Saṃyutta

III. Khandha Vagga

PTS: Saṃyutta Nikāya Volume 3, Khandha Vagga ed. by M. Léon Feer, London: Pāḷi Text Society 1890. The html formatted Pāḷi Text Society edition of the Pāḷi text.
BJT: Saṃyutta Nikāya Volume 3, Khandha Vagga The Sri Lanka Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series Pāḷi text.

The Pāḷi text for individual suttas listed below is adapted from the Sri Lanka Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series [BJT], not from the PTS version. Each translation is linked to its Pāḷi version and to the PTS, Sister Upalavanna, Olds and where available to the ATI Bhk. Thanissaro translation, and each of these is in turn linked back to each of the others. Many, but not all have been checked against the Pāḷi Text Society edition, and many have been reformatted to include the original Pāḷi (and/or organizational) phrase and sentence breaks.

PTS: The Kindred Sayings on Elements, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids assisted by F.L. Woodward,
WP: The Book of the Aggregates, translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi
BD: The translations of M. Olds
ATI: The translations of Bhikkhu Thanissaro and others originally located on Access to Insight.

III. Ditthi Saṃyutta, III.202

Note: This entire saṃyutta should be read alongside Dīgha Nikāya 1, the sections on Higher Dhamma Speculations where not only is the view itself given but also a more detailed description of how the view is arrived at.

PTS: The Kindred Sayings on Views, III.164
WP: Connected Discourses on Views, I.991

III.I. Sotāpatti Vagga, III.202

1. Vāta Suttaṃ, III.202

The Buddha states that the view that the world and the things of the world are static arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: Wind, III.164
BD: Wind
WP: Winds, I.991

2. Etaṃ Mama Suttaṃ, III.203

The Buddha states that the view that some thing belongs to the self, or that some thing is the self arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: This is Mine, III.165
BD: This is Mine
WP: This is Mine, I.992

3. So Attā Suttaṃ, III.204

The Buddha states that the view that that which is the self and that which is the world for one will become stable in the hereafter arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: That is the Self, III.166
BD: That Which is My Own Self
WP: The Self, I.992

4. No ca Me Siyā Suttaṃ, III.205

The Buddha states that the view that had it not been considered as belonging to the self in the past, it would not be considered as belonging to the self in the present, that if it is not considered the self in the present it will not be considered self in the future arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
This is the same 'view' as stated in SN 3.22.81 and SN 3.22.152. Here the saying is to be understood as a point of view whereas elsewhere it is to be used as an aspiration. "Had this not been considered mine in the past, it would not be considered mine in the present, if it is not considered mine in the present it will not be considered mine in the future" vs "Having considered this as mine in the past I experience it as mine in the present, let me not consider this mine in the present so that it will not be considered mine in the future." Somehow constructed so that both meanings are seen in the identical wording.

See here my footnote to this sutta which reads in stead of "considred mine", "being". The other translators are taking this as an already-formed Buddhist view which I think is not called for in the Pāḷi.

PTS: It May Not Be Mine, III.166
BD: If There Were No Being
WP: It Might Not Be For Me, I.993

5. N'atthi Suttaṃ, III.206

The Buddha states that the view that there is no such thing as kamma and its results arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
The full statement of the view is (Bhk. Bodhi's translation, for comparison; see also DN 2 (Rhys Davids):
"There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing presented in charity; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no ascetics and Brahmins faring and practicing rightly in the world who, having realized this world and the other world for themselves by direct knowledge, make them known to others. This person consists of the four great elements. When one dies, earth returns to and merges with the earth-body; water returns to and merges with the water-body; fire returns to and merges with the fire-body; air returns to and merges with the air-body; the faculties are transferred to space. [Four] men with the bier as fifth carry away the corpse. The funeral orations last as far as the charnel ground; the bones whiten; burnt offerings end with ashes. Giving is a doctrine of fools. When anyone asserts the doctrine that there is [giving and the like], it is empty, false prattle. Fools and the wise are alike cut off and perish with the breakup of the body; after death they do not exist."
At least here today [USA Monday, February 09, 2015 6:21 AM] the popular belief has not gone as far as to deny the existence of mothers and fathers, and Giving is still a much valued if often abused and misdirected practice.
This view is often stated as the belief that 'there is not,' and is what is often cited when the term 'micchā-ditthi' (misguided views) is used.

PTS: There is Not, III.166
BD: Non-Existence
WP: There Is Not, I.993

6. Karoto Suttaṃ, III.208

The Buddha states that the view that there is no such thing as good and evil deeds arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
The view of Pūraṇa Kassapa, on the ineffectiveness of action in the production of consequences.
Bhk. Bodhi's translation of this view:
"When one acts or makes others act, when one mutilates or makes others mutilate, when one tortures or makes others inflict torture, when one inflicts sorrow or makes others inflict sorrow, when one oppresses or makes others inflict oppression, when one intimidates or makes others inflict intimidation, when one destroys life, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, plunders wealth, commits burglary, ambushes highways, seduces another's wife, utters falsehood — no evil is done by the doer. If, with a razor-rimmed wheel, one were to make the living beings of this earth into one mass of flesh, into one heap of flesh, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the south bank of the Ganges killing and slaughtering, mutilating and making others mutilate, torturing and making others inflict torture, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving gifts and making others give gifts, making offerings and making others make offerings, because of this there would be no merit and no outcome of merit. By giving, by taming oneself, by self-control, by speaking truth, there is no merit and no outcome of merit."
These views are not the products of simple-minded fools. They are arrived at at a point in deep meditative trances where the atomic nature of things is seen and the conclusion is reached that there is no individuality or even reality to anything and that the world is in fact a static illusion. A conclusion reached upon real perception, if not given the consideration it would be given by a follower of the Buddha.

PTS: For Him Who Acts, III.168
BD: Making
WP: Acting, I.994

7. Hetu Suttaṃ, III.210

The Buddha states that the view that there is no such thing as driving forces and their results (kamma) arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
Bhk. Bodhi's translation of this view:
"There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings; beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings; beings are purified without cause or condition [There is no action by self, no action by others, no manly action.] There is no power, no energy, no manly strength, no manly endurance. All beings, all living beings, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power, and energy; molded by destiny, circumstance, and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes."
Note here Woodward translates 'hetu' (usually 'cause', but literally 'driving force' as in the force used by the driver to get the ox to move the cart along) as 'condition' and 'paccaya' (usually 'condition', but better as 'result', or 'repercussion') as 'cause'.

PTS: Condition, III.169
BD: Driving Force
WP: Cause, I.995

8. Mahā Diṭṭhi Suttaṃ, III.211

The Buddha states that the view that the elements are neither made nor caused to be made, that there is no such thing as kamma, and that the world is an illusion arising from a static reality arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
A long, mad, rambling point of view similar to the previous two proposed by Pakudha Kaccāyana and expounded by Makkhali of the Cow-pen.
Note: Woodward here translates 'diṭṭhi' as heresy. This is not a correct translation, but is an interpretation put on the word when used of certain views. From the Buddhist perspective all views are essentially incorrect. Sammā Diṭṭhi (right view, or, better, consummate or high view) is 'high' or 'consummate' only in so far as it serves the goal. Similarly one must understand 'sammā diṭṭhi' as a view from the perspective of its goal or it becomes at least partially incorrect.
Again perceptions giving rise to views of the sort found in the last three suttas can be encountered by any meditator. The world is seen as arising images, then vibrating atoms and then even the vibration stops as well and it is very easy to conclude that there is no existing as a living being and that therefore there is no doing evil or good deeds as it is just illusions passing through illusions. It is for this reason that a thorough understanding that kamma is action based on intent is so important. Real or not, intentional acts produce subjectively experienced results, and that is as good as saying that the consensus reality must be respected and dealt with as it is subjectively experienced by the ordinary common man and that being the case the view that 'it exists' cannot be rationally denied even when it cannot be rationally asserted.

PTS: By the (Great) Heresy, III.170
BD: The Big Picture
WP: The Great View, I.995

9. Sassata Loka Suttaṃ, III.213

The Buddha states that the view that the world is eternal arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The World is Eternal, III.172
BD: Eternal is the World
WP: The World Is Eternal, I.997

10. Asassata Loka Suttaṃ, III.214

The Buddha states that the view that the world is not eternal arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The World is Not Eternal, III.172
BD: Not Eternal is the World
WP: The World is not Eternal, I.997

11. Antavā Suttaṃ, III.214

The Buddha states that the view that the world has beginnings and ends arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
'Anta' is 'end' or 'preceding' or 'after' or 'opposite' (as in antler, ante-), but can mean 'limit' or (as per Bhk. Bodhi) 'finite'. PED: 'What faces one at the start' which is a good way to access the point of view mentioned in this sutta — looking out (in your mind's eye) from your face as you sit, see how you can view the world as an ending thing or an endless thing. Is it coming to an end at your face, or is it just taking off from there?

PTS: Limited (is the World), III.172
BD: The World Has Endpoints
WP: The World is Finite, I.997

12. Anantavā Suttaṃ, III.215

The Buddha states that the view that the world does not have beginnings and ends arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: Unlimited (is the world), III.172
BD: Without Endpoints is the World
WP: The World is Infinite, I.997

13. Taṇ Jīvan, Taṇ Sarīra Suttaṃ, III.215

The Buddha states that the view that that which is the body is that which is life arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.
Bhk. Bodhi translates 'jīva' here and in the next sutta as 'soul'. 'Jīva' is usually just 'life' and the term most usually used for what we understand as 'soul' is the Pāḷi 'atta' (where PED states 'Vedic ātman, not to Gr. ἂνεμος = Latin animus, but to Gr. ἁτμός steam, Ohg. ātum breath, Ags. aepm.' PED would support "soul".
The question is: Is this a point of view concerning the soul, or life, or individuality? It's probably best to reserve judgment and consider it as dealing with all three.

PTS: What the Life Is, That Is the Body, III.172
BD: The Self and the Body are One and the Same
WP: Soul and Body Are the Same, I.998

14. Aññaṇ Jīvan, Aññaṇ Sarīra Suttaṃ, III.215

The Buddha states that the view that that which is the body is something other than that which is life arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Life is One Thing, the Body is Another, III.172
BD: The Self is One Thing and the Body is Another
WP: Soul and Body Are Different, I.998

15. Hoti Tathāgata Suttaṃ, III.215

The Buddha states that the view that the Thathāgata (one who has attained the goal; but allso the term used by Gotama when referring to himself) exists arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Tathāgata Exists, III.172
BD: The Tathāgata Exists
WP: The Tathāgata Exists, I.998

16. Na Hoti Tathāgata Suttaṃ, III.215

The Buddha states that the view that the Tathāgata (one who has attained the goal) does not exist arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Tathāgata Exists Not, III.172
BD: The Tathāgata Does Not Exist
WP: The Tathāgata Does Not Exist, I.998

17. Hoti ca na ca Hoti Tathāgata Suttaṃ, III.215

The Buddha states that the view that the Tathāgata (one who has attained the goal) exists and does not exist arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Tathāgata both Exists and Exists Not, III.172
BD: The Tathāgata Exists and Does Not Exist
WP: The Tathāgata Both Exists and Does Not Exist, I.999

18. N'eva Hoti na na Hoti Tathāgata Suttaṃ, III.216

The Buddha states that the view that the Tathāgata (one who has attained the goal) neither exists nor does not exist arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Tathāgata Neither Exists nor Exists Not, III.172
BD: The Tathāgata Neither Exists nor Does Not Exist
WP: The Tathāgata Neither Exists Nor Does Not Exist, I.999

III.II.1: Purimagamanam (Aṭṭhārasa-Veyyākaraṇāni),

[Note: As this Chapter is identical to the previous (Suttas 1-18) it has been abridged in the PTS translation and the Pali, by the inclusion of the first and last suttas (19 and 36) in their complete form and Suttas 20-35 are given by title only but are linked to their corresponding sutta in the previous Chapter.] The Olds translation is given in full.
These suttas are not the usual form of repetition as found in a wheel where there is always a small change made in each sutta, but are verbatim repetitions of the previous suttas. In other words, these repetitions are exactly what they state they are: repetitions. We likely have here an example of the way the suttas were memorized.

PTS: (First Repetition (of the Eighteen Instructions), I.56
BD: Repetition

19. Vātā Suttaṃ, III.217

PTS: Winds, III.173
WP: Winds, I.1000

20-35. Purimagamanāhi Aṭṭhārasa-Veyyākaraṇāni Vitthārānīti, (same as previous section), III.218

PTS: (II 20-35) III.173
WP: 20-36: This is Mine, Etc., I.1000

36. Neva Hoti na na Hoti Tathāgata Suttaṃ, III.218

PTS: Neither exists nor exists not, III.173

III.II.2: Dutiya-gamanam (or Dutiya-vāro) (Second Repetition) (WP omits section break), III.218

[Note: This chapter is called 'Second Repetition', but it is not a repetition, it is a variation with a different set of 'views' placed into the same form as the previous suttas in the chapter. Therefore the suttas are presented in individual files, unabridged.]

37. Rūpī Attā Suttaṃ, III.218

The Buddha states that the view that the self has form and is not diseased after death arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self has Form, III.174
BD: The Self Has Intact Form after Death,
WP: A Self Consisting of Form, I.1000

38. Arūpī Attā Suttaṃ, III.219

The Buddha states that the view that the self is without form and is not diseased after death arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self is Formless, III.174
BD: The Self is without Form and is Intact after Death,
WP: A Formless Self, I.1001

39. Rūpī ca Arūpī Attā Suttaṃ, III.219

The Buddha states that the view that the self both has form and is without form and is not diseased after death arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self Both has Form and Is Formless, III.174
BD: The Self is Both With and Without Form,
WP: A Self Both Consisting of Form and Formless, I.1001

40. N'eva Rūpī N'ārūpī Attā Suttaṃ, III.219

The Buddha states that the view that the self neither has form nor is without form and is not diseased after death arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self Neither has Form Nor Is Formless, III.174
BD: Neither Does the Self Have Form, nor Does it Not Have Form,
WP: A Self Neither Consisting of Form nor Formess, I.1001

41. Ekanta-sukhī Suttaṃ, III.219

The Buddha states that the view that the self is exclusively pleasurable after death and is not diseased arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self Is Sheer Bliss, III.174
BD: Exclusively Pleasurable,
WP: Exclusively Happy, I.1001

42. Ekanta-dukkhī Suttaṃ, III.220

The Buddha states that the view that the self is exclusively painful after death and is not diseased arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self Is Sheer Suffering, III.174
BD: Exclusively Painful,
WP: Exclusively Miserable, I.1001

43. Sukha-dukkhī Suttaṃ, III.220

The Buddha states that the view that the self is both pleasurable and painful after death and is not diseased arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of form, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and sense-consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self Is Bliss and Suffering, III.174
BD: Pleasurable and Painful,
WP: Both Happy and Miserable, I.1001

44. Adukkham-asukhī Suttaṃ, III.220

The Buddha states that the view that the self is neither painful nor pleasurable after death and is not diseased arises from not understanding the impermanent and painful nature of shape, sense-experience, perception, own-making, and consciousness and the seen, heard, sensed, cognized, acquired, investigated, or turned over in mind.

PTS: The Self Is without Bliss or Suffering, III.174
BD: Without Pain but Without Pleasure,
WP: Neither Happy nor Miserable, I.1001

III.III: Tatiyagamanam, (Third Repetition), III.221

[Note: As the suttas of this Chapter are identical to the previous Suttas 1-18 and 37-44 of the Diṭṭhi Saṇyutta the Pāḷi and PTS translation have been abridged here by the inclusion of the first and last suttas (45 and 70) in their complete form and Suttas 46-69 are given by title only but are linked to their corresponding sutta in the previous Chapters. The Olds translation is completely rolled out.]

45. Vāta Suttaṃ, III.221

PTS: WindsIII.175
BD: Third Repitition
WP: Winds, I.1002

46-69., III.221

PTS: 46-69 III.175
WP: 46-70: This Is Mine, Etc., I.1002

70. Adukkha-Asukhī Suttaṃ, III.222

PTS: The Self Is without Bliss or Suffering, III.175