Dīgha Nikāya


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Sacred Books of the Buddhists
Volume II

Dīgha Nikāya

Dialogues of the Buddha
Part I

Sutta 9

Poṭṭhapāda Suttantaɱ

The Soul Theory

Translated from the Pali by T.W. Rhys Davids

Public Domain

Originally published under the patronage of
His Majesty King Chulālankarana,
King of Siam
by The Pali Text Society, Oxford

 


[241]

Introduction
to the
Poṭṭhapāda Sutta

This Sutta, beginning with a discussion on the mystery of trance, passes over, by a natural transition, or association of ideas, to the question of soul. For trance (as is pointed out by Poṭṭhapāda in § 6) had been explained by adherents of the soul theory as produced by the supposed fact of a 'soul' having gone away out of the body.

As is well known, this hypothesis of a soul inside the body has been adopted, and no doubt quite independently, among so many different peoples in all parts of the world that it may fairly be described as almost universal. It is even by no means certain that it has not been quite universal; in which case its adoption is probably a necessary result of the methods of thought possible to men in early times. But it is, unfortunately, very easy for us, who now no longer use the word 'soul' exclusively in its original sense, to misunderstand the ancient view, and to import into it modern conceptions.[1] The oldest and simplest form of the hypothesis was frankly materialistic. The notion was that of a double — shadowy, no doubt, and impalpable — but still a physical double of the physical body; and made up, like the body, of the four elements.

When the 'soul' was away the body lay still, without moving, apparently without life, in trance. or disease, or sleep. When the 'soul' came back, motion began again, and life. Endless were the corollaries of a theory which, however devoid of the essential marks of a sound scientific hypothesis, underlies every variety of early speculation in India, as elsewhere.

Long before the date of the earliest records of Indian belief this theory, among the ancestors of the men to whom we owe those records, had gone through a whole course of development of which the Vedas show us only the results. They take the theory so completely for granted that the [242] details of it, as they held it, are nowhere set out in full, or in any detail. The hypothesis having been handed down from time immemorial, and being accepted by all, it was considered amply sufficient to refer to it in vague and indirect phraseology.[2] And the stage which the theory had reached before the time when our Sutta was composed can only be pieced together imperfectly from incidental references in the Upanishads.

I have collected these references together in the article already referred to (J.R.A.S., 1899), and need here only state the result. This is that the Upanishads show how the whole theory of the priests, as there set out, is throughout based on this old theory of a soul inside the body. The numerous details are full of inconsistencies, more especially on the point, so important to theologians, as to what happens to the soul after it flies away from the body. But not one of these inconsistent views leaves for a moment the basis of the soul theory. That is always taken for granted. And the different views set out in these priestly manuals by no means exhaust the list of speculations about the soul that must have been current in India when Buddhism arose, and when our Sutta was composed. There were almost certainly other views, allied to one or other of the thirty-two theories controverted above (pp. 44, 45), A careful search would no doubt reveal passages, even in the later priestly literature itself, acknowledging views which do not happen to be referred to in the Upanishads, but which bear the stamp of great antiquity — such passages as Mahābhārata XII, 11704, where we are told that if the soul, in departing from the body goes out by way of the knees, it will go to the Sādhyas.

However, that may be, it is certain that all the religions, and all the philosophies, the existing records show to have existed in India, in the time when Buddhism arose, are based on this belief in a subtle but material 'soul' inside the body, and in shape like the body. It would scarcely be going too far to say that all religions, and all philosophies, then existing in the world. were based upon it. Buddhism stands alone among the religions of India in ignoring the soul. The vigour and originality of this new departure are evident from the complete isolation in which Buddhism stands, in this respect, from all other religious systems then existing in the world. And the very great difficulty which those European writers, who are still steeped in animistic [243] preconceptions, find in appreciating, or even understanding the doctrine, may help us to realise how difficult it must have been for the originator of it to take so decisive and so far-reaching a step in religion and philosophy, at so early a period in the history of human thought.

Nearly a quarter of a century ago I put this in the forefront of my first exposition of Buddhism. The publication, since then, of numerous texts has shown how the early Buddhist writers had previously followed precisely the same method.[3] They reserve, as is only natural, the enthusiasm of their poetry and eloquence for the positive side of their doctrine, for Arahatship. But the doctrine of the impermanence of each and every condition, physical or mental; the absence of any abiding principle, any entity, any substance, any 'soul' (aniccatā, nissattatā, nijjīvatā, anattalakkhaṇatā, na h'ettha sassato bhāvo attā vā upalabbhati) is treated, from the numerous points of view from which it can be approached, in as many different Suttas.

For the most part, one point only is dealt with in each text. In our Sutta it is, in the first place, the gradual change of mental conditions, of states of consciousness: and then, secondly, the point that personality, individuality (atta-paṭilābho) is only a convenient expression in common use in the world, and therefore made use of also by the Tathāgata, but only in such a manner that he is not led astray by its ambiguity, by its apparent implication of some permanent entity.

 


 

[244] [178]

Poṭṭhapāda Suttantaɱ

The Soul Theory

[1][than] THUS HAVE I HEARD.

The Exalted One was once staying at Sāvatthi
in Anātha Piṇḍika's pleasaunce
in the Jeta Wood.

Now at that time Poṭṭhapāda,[4]
the wandering mendicant,
was dwelling at the hall
put up in Queen Mallikā's Park
for the discussion of systems of opinion -
the hall set round
with a row of Tinduka trees,
and known by the name of 'The Hall.'[5]

And there was with him
a great following of mendicants;
to wit, three hundred mendicants.

2[6] Now the Exalted One,
who had put on his under garment
in the early morning,
proceeded in his robes,
and with his bowl in his hand,
into Sāvatthi for alms.

[245] And he thought:

"It is too early now
to enter Sāvatthi for alms.

Let me go to the Hall,
the debating hall in the Mallikā Park,
where Poṭṭhapāda is."

And he did so.

3. Now at that time
Poṭṭhapāda was seated
with the company of the mendicants
all talking with loud voices,
with shouts and tumult,
all sorts of worldly talk,
to wit:

Tales of kings,
of robbers,
of ministers of state;
tales of war,
of terrors,
of battles;
talks about foods and drinks,
about clothes
and beds
and garlands
and perfumes;
talks about relationships;
talks about equipages,
villages,
towns,
cities,
and countries;
tales about women and heroes;
gossip such as that at street corners,
and places whence water is fetched;
ghost stories;
desultory chatter;
legends about the creation of the land or sea;
and speculations about existence and non-existence.[7]

[179] 4. And Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant,
caught sight of the Exalted One
approaching in the distance.

And at the sight of him
he called the assembly to order,
saying:

"Be still, venerable Sirs,
and make no noise.

Here is the Samaṇa Gotama coming.

Now that venerable one delights in quiet,
and speaks in praise of quietude.

How well it were
if, seeing how quiet the assembly is,
he should see fit to join us!"

And when he spake thus,
the mendicants kept silence.

5. Now the Exalted One came on
to where Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant was.

And the latter said to him:

"May the Exalted One come near.

We bid him welcome.

It is long since the Exalted One
took the departure[8]
of coming our way.

Let him take a seat.

Here is a place spread ready."

And the Exalted One sat down.

And Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant,
brought a low stool,
and sat down beside him.

And to him thus seated
the Exalted One said:

[246] "What was the subject, Poṭṭhapāda,
that you were seated here together to discuss;
and what was the talk among you
that has been interrupted?"

6. And when he had thus spoken, Poṭṭhapāda said:

"Never mind, Sir,
the subject we were seated together to discuss.

There will be no difficulty
in the Exalted One hearing afterwards about that.

But long ago, Sir,
on several occasions,
when various teachers,
Samaṇas and Brahmans,
had met together,
and were seated in the debating hall,
the talk fell on trance,[9]
and the question was:

[180] 'How then, Sirs,
is the cessation of consciousness
brought about?'

Now on that
some said thus:

'Ideas come to a man
without a reason
and without a cause,
and so also do they pass away.

At the time when they spring up within him,
then he becomes conscious;
when they pass away,
then he becomes unconscious.'

Thus did they explain
the cessation of consciousness.

-◦-

On that another said:

'That, Sirs, will never be so
as you say.

Consciousness, Sirs, is a man's soul.

It is the soul that comes and goes.

When the soul comes into a man
then he becomes conscious,
when the soul goes away out of a man
then he becomes unconscious.'

Thus do others explain
the cessation of consciousness.[10]

-◦-

On that another said:

'That, Sirs, will never be as you say.

But there are certain Samaṇas and Brahmans
of great power and influence.

It is they who infuse consciousness into a man,
and draw it away out of him.

When they infuse it into him
he becomes conscious,
when they draw it away
he becomes unconscious.'

Thus do others explain
the cessation of consciousness.[11]

[247] Then, Sir, the memory of the Exalted One
arose in me,
and I thought:

'Would that the Exalted One,
would that the Happy One were here,
he who is so skilled in these psychical states.

For the Exalted One would know
how trance is brought about.[12]

How, then, Sir, is there
cessation of consciousness?"

7. "Well, as to that, Poṭṭhapāda,
those Samaṇas and Brahmans
who said that ideas come to a man
and pass away
without a reason,
and without a cause,
are wrong from the very commencement.

For it is precisely through a reason,
by means of a cause,
that ideas come and go.

[181] By training
some ideas arise.

By training
others pass away.

 

§

 

And what is that training?"
continued the Exalted One.

"Suppose, Poṭṭhapāda, there appears in the world
one who has won the truth, an Arahat,
a fully awakened one,
abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy,
who knows all worlds,
unsurpassed as a guide
to mortals willing to be led,
a teacher for gods and men,
a Blessed One,
a Buddha.

He, by himself, thoroughly knows and sees,
as it were, face-to-face this universe,
— including the worlds above of the gods,
the Brahmas, and the Māras,
and the world below with its recluses and Brahmans,
its princes and peoples, —
and having known it,
he makes his knowledge known to others.

The truth, lovely in its origin,
lovely in its progress,
lovely in its consummation,
doth he proclaim,
both in the spirit and in the letter,
the higher life doth he make known,
in all its fullness and in all its purity.

A householder, or one of his children,
or a man of inferior birth in any class
listens to that truth;
and on hearing it he has faith in the Tathāgata (the one who has found the truth);
and when he is possessed of that faith,
he considers thus within himself:

'Full of hindrances is household life,
a path for the dust of passion.

Free as the air is the life
of him who has renounced all worldly things.

How difficult is it for the man who dwells at home
to live the higher life in all its fullness,
in all its purity,
in all its bright perfection!

Let me then cut off my hair and beard,
let me clothe myself in the orange-coloured robes,
and let me go forth
from the household life
into the homeless state.'

Then, before long,
forsaking his portion of wealth,
be it great or small,
forsaking his circle of relatives,
be they many or be they few,
he cuts off his hair and beard,
he clothes himself in the orange-coloured robes,
and he goes forth from the household life
into the homeless state.

When he has thus become a recluse
he lives self-restrained by that restraint that should be binding on a recluse.

Uprightness is his delight,
and he sees danger
in the least of those things he should avoid.

-◦-

He adopts, and trains himself in, the precepts.

-◦-

He encompasses himself
with good deeds in act and word.

-◦-

Pure are his means of livelihood,
good is his conduct,
guarded the doors of his senses.

-◦-

Mindful and self-possessed
he is altogether happy.

 

§

 

'And how, Poṭṭhapāda, is his conduct good?

'In this, Poṭṭhapāda, that the Bhikshu,
putting away the killing of living things,
holds aloof from the destruction of life.

The cudgel and the sword he has laid aside,
and ashamed of roughness,
and full of mercy,
he dwells compassionate and kind
to all creatures that have life.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Putting away the taking
of what has not been given,
he lives aloof from grasping
what is not his own.

He takes only what is given,
and expecting that gifts will come,
he passes his life in honesty
and purity of heart.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Putting away unchastity,
he is chaste.

He holds himself aloof,
far off from the vulgar practice,
from the sexual act.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Putting away lying words,
he holds himself aloof from falsehood.

He speaks truth,
from the truth he never swerves;
faithful and trustworthy,
he breaks not his word to the world.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Putting away slander,
he holds himself aloof from calumny.

What he hears here
he repeats not elsewhere
to raise a quarrel
against the people here;
what he hears elsewhere
he repeats not here
to raise a quarrel
against the people there.

Thus does he live as a binder together
of those who are divided,
an encourager of those who are friends,
a peacemaker,
a lover of peace,
impassioned for peace,
a speaker of words that make for peace.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Putting away rudeness of speech,
he holds himself aloof from harsh language.

Whatsoever word is blameless,
pleasant to the car,
lovely,
reaching to the heart,
urbane,
pleasing to the people,
beloved of the people -
such are words he speaks.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Putting away frivolous talk,
he holds himself aloof from vain conversation.

In season he speaks,
in accordance with the facts,
words full of meaning,
on religion,
on the discipline of the Order.

He speaks, and at the right time,
words worthy to be laid up in one's heart,
fitly illustrated,
clearly divided,
to the point.

-◦-

He holds himself aloof
from causing injury to seeds or plants.

He takes but one meal a day,
not eating at night,
refraining from food after hours
(after midday).

He refrains from being a spectator
at shows at fairs,
with nautch dances,
singing, and music.

He abstains from wearing,
adorning,
or ornamenting himself
with garlands, scents, and unguents.

He abstains from the use
of large and lofty beds.

He abstains from accepting silver or gold.

He abstains from accepting uncooked grain.

He abstains from accepting raw meat.

He abstains from accepting women or girls.

He abstains from accepting bondmen or bondwomen.

He abstains from accepting sheep or goats.

He abstains from accepting fowls or swine.

He abstains from accepting elephants, cattle. horses, and mares.

He abstains from accepting cultivated fields or waste.

He abstains from acting as a go-between or messenger.

He abstains from buying and selling.

He abstains from cheating
with scales or bronzes or measures.

He abstains from the crooked ways
of bribery, cheating, and fraud.

He abstains from maiming,
murder,
putting in bonds,
highway robbery,
dacoity,
and violence.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

 

§

 

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to the injury of seedlings
and growing plants
whether propagated from roots
or cuttings
or joints
or buddings
or seeds
the Bhikshu holds aloof from such injury
to seedlings and growing plants.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to the use
of things stored up;
stores, to wit,
of foods,
drinks,
clothing,
equipages,
bedding,
perfumes,
and curry-stuffs —
the Bhikshu holds aloof from such use
of things stored up.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to visiting shows;
that is to say:

(1) Nautch dances (naccaɱ);

(2) Singing of songs (gītaɱ);

(3) Instrumental music (vāditaɱ);

(4) Shows at fairs (pekkhaɱ);

(5) Ballad recitations (akkhānaɱ);

(6) Hand music (pāṇissaraɱ);

(7) The chanting of bards (vetālaɱ);

(8) Tam - tam playing (kumbhathūnaɱ);

(9) Fairy scenes (Sobhanagarakaɱ);

(10) Acrobatic feats by Kaṇḍālas (Kaṇḍāla-vaɱsa-dhopanaɱ);

(11) Combats of elephants,
horses,
buffaloes,
bulls,
goats,
rams,
cocks,
and quails;

(12) Bouts at quarter-staff,
boxing,
wrestling;

(13) Sham-fights.

(14) roll-calls.

(15) manoeuvres.

(16) reviews —

the Bhikshu holds aloof from visiting such shows.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to games and recreations;
that is to say:

(1) Games on boards with eight,
or with ten,
rows of squares;

(2) The same games
played by imagining such boards in the air;

(3) Keeping going over diagrams drawn on the ground
so that one steps only where one ought to go;

(4) Either removing the pieces or men from a heap
with one's nail,
or putting them into a heap,
in each case without shaking it,
he who shakes the heap, loses;

(5) Throwing dice;

(6) Hitting a short stick with a long one;

(7) Dipping the hand with the fingers stretched out
in lac,
or red dye,
or flower-water,
and striking the wet hand
on the ground
or on a wall,
calling out
'What shell it be?'
and showing the form required —
elephants, horses, etc.;

(8) Games with balls;

(9) Blowing through toy pipes made of leaves;

(10) Ploughing with toy ploughs;

(11) Turning summersaults;

(12) Playing with toy windmills made of palm-leaves;

(13) Playing with toy measures made of palm-leaves;

(14, 15) Playing with toy carts or toy bows;

(16) Guessing at letters traced in the air, or on a. playfellow's back;

(17) Guessing the play fellow's thoughts;

(18) Mimicry of deformities;

The Bhikshu holds aloof from such games and recreations.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to the use of high and large couches;
that is to say:

(1) Moveable settees,
high, and six feet long;

(2) Divans with animal figures carved on the supports (Pallanko);

(3) Goats' hair coverlets
with very long fleece (Gonako);

(4) Patchwork counterpanes of many colours (Cittakā);

(5) White blankets (Paṭikā);

(6) Woollen coverlets embroidered with flowers (Paṭalikā);

(7) Quilts stuffed with cotton wool (Tūlikā);

(8) Coverlets embroidered with figures of lions, tigers, etc. (Vikatikā);

(9) Rugs with fur on both sides (Uddalomī);

(10) Rugs with fur on one side (Ekantalomī);

(11) Coverlets embroidered with gems (Kaṭṭhissaɱ);

(12) Silk coverlets (Koseyyaɱ);

(13) Carpets large enough for sixteen dancers (Kuttakaɱ);

(14) Elephant rugs;

(15) horse rugs;

(16) chariot rugs;

(17) Rugs of antelope skins sewn together (Ajina-paveṇi);

(18) Rugs of skins of the plantain antelope;

(19) Carpets with awnings above them (Sauttara-cchadaɱ);

(20) Sofas with red pillows
for the head and feet.

The Bhikshu holds aloof from such things.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to the use
of means for adorning
and beautifying themselves;
that is to say:

Rubbing in scented powders on one's body,
shampooing it,
and bathing it;

Patting the limbs with clubs
after the manner of wrestlers;

The use of mirrors,
eye-ointments,
garlands,
rouge,
cosmetics,
bracelets,
necklaces,
walking-sticks,
reed cases for drugs,
rapiers,
sunshades,
embroidered slippers,
turbans,
diadems,
whisks of the yak's tail,
and long-fringed white robes;

The Bhikshu holds aloof
from such means of adorning and beautifying the person.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to such low conversation as these:

Tales of kings,
of robbers,
of ministers of state,
tales of war,
of terrors,
of battles;
talk about foods and drinks,
clothes,
beds,
garlands,
perfumes;
talks about relationships,
equipages,
villages,
town,
cities,
and countries;
tales about women,
and about heroes;
gossip at street corners,
or places whence water is fetched;
ghost stories;
desultory talk;
speculations about the creation of the land or sea,
or about existence and non-existence;

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low conversation.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to the use of wrangling phrases such as:

'You don't understand this doctrine and discipline,
I do.';

'How should you know about this doctrine and discipline?';

'You have fallen into wrong views.

It is I who am in the right.';

'I am speaking to the point,
you are not.';

'You are putting last
what ought to come first,
first what ought to come last.';

'What you've excogitated so long,
that's all quite upset.';

'Your challenge has been taken up.';

'You are proved to be wrong.';

'Set to work to clear your views.';

'Disentangle yourself if you can.';

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such wrangling phrases.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
continue addicted to taking messages,
going on errands,
and acting as go-betweens;
to wit,
on kings,
ministers of state,
Kshatriyas,
Brahmans,
or young men,
saying:

'Go there,
come hither,
take this with you,
bring that from thence';

the Bhikshu abstains from such servile duties.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
are tricksters,
droners out (of holy words for pay),
diviners,
and exorcists,
ever hungering to add gain to gain —
the Bhikshu holds aloof from such deception and patter.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by low arts,
such as these:

(1) Palmistry —
prophesying long life,
prosperity, etc.
from marks on child's hands,
feet. etc.;

(2) Divining by means of omens and signs;

(3) Auguries drawn from thunderbolts
and other celestial portents;

(4) Prognostication by interpreting dreams;

(5) Fortune-telling from marks on the body;

(6) Auguries from the marks on cloth gnawed by mice;

(7) Sacrificing to Agni;

(8) Offering oblations from a spoon;

(9-13) Making offerings to gods
of husks,
of the red powder between the grain and the husk,
of husked grain ready for boiling,
of ghee,
and of oil;

(14) Sacrificing by spewing mustard seeds, etc.,
into the fire out of one's mouth;

(15) Drawing blood from one's right knee
as a sacrifice to the gods;

(16) Looking at the knuckles, etc.,
and, after muttering a charm,
divining whether a man is well born
or lucky or not;

(17) Determining whether the site
for a proposed house or pleasance,
is lucky or not;

(18) Advising on customary law;

(19) Laying demons in a cemetery;

(20) Laying ghosts;

(21) Knowledge of the charms to be used
when lodging in an earth house;

(22) Snake charming;

(23) The poison craft;

(24) The scorpion craft;

(25) The mouse craft;

(26) The bird craft;

(27) The crow craft;

(28) Foretelling the number of years
that a man has yet to live.

(29) Giving charms to ward off arrows;

(30) The animal wheel;

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by low arts,
such as these:

Knowledge of the signs
of good and bad qualities
in the following things
and of the marks in them
denoting the health or luck of their owners: —
to wit,
gems,
staves,
garments,
swords,
arrows,
bows,
other weapons,
women,
men,
boys,
girls,
slaves,
slave-girls,
elephants,
horses,
buffaloes,
bulls,
oxen,
goats,
sheep,
fowls,
quails,
iguanas,
earrings,
tortoises,
and other animals;

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by low arts,
such as soothsaying,
to the effect that:

'The chiefs will march out';

'The chiefs will march back';

'The home chiefs will attack,
and the enemies' retreat';

'The enemies' chiefs will attack,
and ours will retreat';

'The home chiefs will gain the victory,
and the foreign chiefs suffer defeat';

'The foreign chiefs will gain the victory,
and ours will suffer defeat';

'Thus will there be victory on this side,
defeat on that'

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by such low arts as foretelling:

(1) 'There will be an eclipse of the moon';

(2) 'There will be en eclipse of the sun';

(3) 'There will be en eclipse of a star'
(Nakshatra);

(4) 'There will be aberration of the sun or the moon';

(5) 'The sun or the moon will return to its usual path';

(6) 'There will be aberrations of the stars';

(7) 'The stars will return to their usual course';

(8) 'There will be a fall of meteors';

(9) 'There will be a jungle fire';

(10) 'There will be an earthquake';

(11) 'The god will thunder';

(12-15) 'There will be rising and setting,
clearness and dimness,
of the sun or the moon or the stars',|| ||

or foretelling of each of these fifteen phenomena
that they will betoken such and such a result;

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by low arts,
such as these:

Foretelling an abundant rainfall;

Foretelling a deficient rainfall;

Foretelling a good harvest;

Foretelling scarcity of food;

Foretelling tranquillity;

Foretelling disturbances;

Foretelling a pestilence;

Foretelling a healthy season;

Counting on the fingers;

Counting without using the fingers;

Summing up large totals;

Composing ballads, poetising;

Casuistry, sophistry;

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by low arts,
such as:

(1) Arranging a lucky day for marriages
in which the bride or bridegroom is brought home;

(2) Arranging a lucky day for marriages
in which the bride or bridegroom is sent forth;

(3) Fixing a lucky time for the conclusion of treaties of peace
[or using charms to procure harmony;

(4) Fixing a lucky time
for the outbreak of hostilities
[or using charms to make discord];

(5) Fixing-a lucky time
for the calling in of debts
[or charms for success in throwing dice];

(6) Fixing a lucky time
for the expenditure of money
[or charms to bring ill luck to an opponent throwing dice];

(7) Using charms to make people lucky;

(8) Using charms to make people unlucky;

(9) Using charms to procure abortion;

(10) Incantations to bring on dumbness;

(11) Incantations to keep a man's jaws fixed;

(12) Incantations to make a man throw up his hands;

(13) Incantations to bring on deafness;

(14) Obtaining oracular answers by means of the magic mirror;

(15) Obtaining oracular answers through a girl possessed;

(16) Obtaining oracular answers from a god;

(17) The worship of the Sun;

(18) The worship of the Great One;

(19) Bringing forth flames from one's mouth;

(20) Invoking Siri, the goddess of Luck —

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

-◦-

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans,
while living on food provided by the faithful,
earn their living by wrong means of livelihood,
by low arts,
such as these:

(1) Vowing gifts to a god if a certain benefit be granted;

(2) Paying such vows;

(3) Repeating charms while lodging in an earth house;

(4) Causing virility;

(5) Making a man impotent;

(6) Fixing on lucky sites for dwelling;

(7) Consecrating sites;

(8) Ceremonial rinsings of the month;

(9) Ceremonial bathings;

(10) Offering sacrifices;

(11-14) Administering emetics and purgatives;

(15) Purging people to relieve the head
(that is by giving drugs to make people sneeze);

(16) Oiling people's ears
(either to make them grow or to heal sores on them);

(17) Satisfying people's eyes
(soothing them by dropping medicinal oils into them);

(18) Administering drugs through the nose;

(19) Applying collyrium to the eyes;

(20) Giving medical ointment for the eyes;

(21) Practising as an oculist;

(22) Practising as a surgeon;

(23) Practising as a doctor for children;

(24) Administering roots and drugs;

(25) Administering medicines in rotation;

the Bhikshu holds aloof from such low arts.

This is part of the goodness that he has.

'And then that Bhikshu, Poṭṭhapāda,
being thus master of the minor moralities,
sees no danger from any side,
that is, so far as concerns his self-restraint in conduct.

Just, Poṭṭhapāda, as a sovereign, duly crowned,
whose enemies have been beaten down,
sees no danger from any side;
that is, so far as enemies are concerned,
so is the Bhikshu confident.

And endowed with this body of morals,
so worthy of honour,
he experiences, within himself,
a sense of ease without alloy.

Thus is it, Poṭṭhapāda, that the Bhikshu becomes righteous.

 

§

 

'And how, Poṭṭhapāda,
is the Bhikshu guarded
as to the doors of his senses?

'When, Poṭṭhapāda, he sees an object with his eye
he is not entranced in the general appearance
or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain
that which might give occasion for evil states,
covetousness and dejection,
to flow in over him
so long as he dwells unrestrained
as to his sense of sight.

He keeps watch upon his faculty of sight,
and he attains to mastery over it.

When, Poṭṭhapāda, he hears a sound with his ear
he is not entranced in the general appearance
or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain
that which might give occasion for evil states,
covetousness and dejection,
to flow in over him
so long as he dwells unrestrained
as to his sense of hearing.

He keeps watch upon his faculty of hearing,
and he attains to mastery over it.

This, Sirs, is that uprightness.

When, Poṭṭhapāda, he smells an odour with his nose
he is not entranced in the general appearance
or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain
that which might give occasion for evil states,
covetousness and dejection,
to flow in over him
so long as he dwells unrestrained
as to his sense of smell.

He keeps watch upon his faculty of smell,
and he attains to mastery over it.

This, Sirs, is that uprightness.

When, Poṭṭhapāda, he tastes a flavour with his tongue
he is not entranced in the general appearance
or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain
that which might give occasion for evil states,
covetousness and dejection,
to flow in over him
so long as he dwells unrestrained
as to his sense of taste.

He keeps watch upon his faculty of taste,
and he attains to mastery over it.

This, Sirs, is that uprightness.

When, Poṭṭhapāda, he feels a touch with his body
he is not entranced in the general appearance
or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain
that which might give occasion for evil states,
covetousness and dejection,
to flow in over him
so long as he dwells unrestrained
as to his sense of touch.

He keeps watch upon his faculty of touch,
and he attains to mastery over it.

This, Poṭṭhapāda, is that uprightness.

When, Poṭṭhapāda, he cognises a phenomenon with his mind
he is not entranced in the general appearance
or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain
that which might give occasion for evil states,
covetousness and dejection,
to flow in over him
so long as he dwells unrestrained
as to his mental (representative) faculty.

He keeps watch upon his representative faculty,
and he attains to mastery over it.

And endowed with this self-restraint,
so worthy of honour,
as regards the senses,
he experiences, within himself, a sense of ease
into which no evil state can enter.

Thus is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that the Bhikshu becomes guarded
as to the doors of his senses.

 

§

 

And how, Poṭṭhapāda, is the Bhikshu
mindful and self-possessed?

In this matter, Poṭṭhapāda
the Bhikshu
in going forth or in coming back
whether looking forward,
or in looking round;
in stretching forth his arm,
or in drawing it in again;
in eating or drinking,
in masticating or swallowing,
in obeying the calls of nature,
in going or standing or sitting,
in sleeping or waking,
in speaking or in being still,
he keeps himself aware
of all it really means.

Thus is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that the Bhikshu becomes mindful and self-possessed.

 

§

 

And how, Poṭṭhapāda, is the Bhikshu content?

In this matter, Poṭṭhapāda,
the Bhikshu is satisfied with sufficient robes
to cherish his body,
with sufficient food
to keep his stomach going.

Whithersoever he may go forth,
these he takes with him as he goes
- just as a bird with his wings, Poṭṭhapāda,
whithersoever he may fly,
carries his wings with him as he flies.

Thus is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that the Bhikshu becomes content.

 

§

 

Then, master of this so excellent body of moral precepts,
gifted with this so excellent self-restraint as to the senses,
endowed with this so excellent mindfulness and self-possession,
filled with this so excellent content,
he chooses some lonely spot
to rest at on his way
— in the woods,
at the foot of a tree,
on a hill side,
in a mountain glen,
in a rocky cave,
in a charnel place,
or on a heap of straw in the open field.

And returning thither
after his round for alms
he seats himself, when his meal is done,
cross-legged,
keeping his body erect,
and his intelligence alert, intent.

 

§

 

Putting away the hankering after the world,
he remains with a heart that hankers not,
and purifies his mind of lusts.

Putting away the corruption
of the wish to injure,
he remains with a heart free from ill temper,
and purifies his mind of malevolence.

Putting away torpor of heart and mind,
keeping his ideas alight,
mindful and self-possessed,
he purifies his mind of weakness and of sloth.

Putting away flurry and worry,
he remains free from fretfulness,
and with heart serene within,
he purifies himself of irritability
and vexation of spirit.

Putting away wavering,
he remains as one passed beyond perplexity;
and no longer in suspense as to what is good,
he purifies his mind of doubt.

'Then just, Poṭṭhapāda,
as when a man, after contracting a loan,
should set a business on foot,
and his business should succeed,
and he should not only be able
to pay off the old debt he had incurred,
but there should be a surplus over
to maintain a wife.

Then would he realise:

'I used to have to carry on my business
by getting into debt,
but it has gone so well with me
that I have paid off what I owed,
and have a surplus over
to maintain a wife.'

And he would be of good cheer at that,
would be glad of heart at that: —

Then just, Poṭṭhapāda,
as if a man were a prey to disease,
in pain, and very ill,
and his food would not digest,
and there were no strength left in him;
and after a time
he were to recover from that disease,
and his food should digest,
and his strength come back to him;
then, when he realised his former and his present state,
he would be of good cheer at that,
he would be glad of heart at that: —

Then just, Poṭṭhapāda,
as if a man were bound in a prison house,
and after a time
he should be set free from his bonds,
safe and sound,
and without any confiscation of his goods;
when he realised his former and his present state,
he would be of good cheer at that,
he would be glad of heart at that: —

Then just, Poṭṭhapāda,
as if a man were a slave,
not his own master,
subject to another,
unable to go whither he would;
and after a time
he should be emancipated from that slavery,
become his own master,
not subject to others,
a free man,
free to go whither he would;
then, on realising his former and his present state,
he would be of good cheer at that,
he would be glad of heart at that: —

Then just, Poṭṭhapāda,
as if a man, rich and prosperous,
were to find himself on a long road,
in a desert, where no food was,
but much danger;
and after a time
were to find himself out of the desert,
arrived safe,
on the borders of his village,
in security and peace;
then, on realising his former and his present state,
he would be of good cheer at that,
he would be glad of heart at that: —

Just so, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikshu,
so long as these five hindrances
are not put away within him
looks upon himself as in debt,
diseased,
in prison,
in slavery,
lost on a desert road.

[182] But when these five hindrances
have been put away within him,
he looks upon himself as freed from debt,
rid of disease,
out of jail,
a free man,
and secure.

And gladness springs up within him
on his realising that,
and joy arises to him thus gladdened,
and so rejoicing
all his frame [248] becomes at ease,
and being thus at ease
he is filled with a sense of peace,
and in that peace his heart is stayed.

 

§

 

Then estranged from lusts,
aloof from evil dispositions,
he enters into and remains in the First Rapture
— a state of joy and ease born of detachment,
reasoning and investigation going on the while.

Then that idea,
(that consciousness),[13] of lusts,
that he had before,
passes away.

And thereupon there arises within him
a subtle, but actual, consciousness
of the joy and peace
arising from detachment,
and he becomes a person
to whom that idea is consciously present.

Thus is it that through training
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of,"
said the, Exalted One.

11. "And again, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikkhu,
suppressing all reasoning and investigation,
enters into and abides in the Second Rapture
(the Second Jhāna) —
a state of joy and case,
born of the serenity of concentration,
when no reasoning or investigation goes on,
a state of elevation of mind,
a tranquillisation of the heart within.

Then that subtle, but actual, consciousness
of the joy and peace arising from detachment,
that he just had,
passes away.

And thereupon there arises
a subtle, but actual,
consciousness of the joy and peace
born of concentration.

And he becomes a person conscious of that.

[183] Thus also is it that through training,
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of," said the Exalted One.

12. "And again, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikkhu,
holding aloof from joy,
becomes equable;
and, mindful and self possessed,
he experiences in his body
that ease which the Arahats talk of
when they say:

'The man serene and self-possessed
is well at case.'

And so he enters [249] into
and abides in
the Third Rapture (the Third Jhāna).

Then that subtle, but yet actual, consciousness,
that he just had,
of the joy and peace born of concentration,
passes away.

And thereupon there arises
a subtle, but yet actual, consciousness
of the bliss of equanimity.

And he becomes a person conscious of that.

Thus also is it
that through training
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of,"
said the Exalted One.

13. "And again, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikkhu,
by the putting away alike
of ease and of pain,
by the passing away
of any joy,
any elation,
he had previously felt,
enters into and abides in
the Fourth Rapture
(the Fourth Jhāna) —
a state of pure self-possession
and equanimity,
without pain and without ease.

Then that subtle, but yet actual, consciousness,
that he just had,
of the bliss of equanimity,
passes away.

And thereupon
there arises to him
a subtle, but yet actual, consciousness
of the absence of pain,
and of the absence of ease.[14]

And he becomes a person conscious of that.

Thus also is it that through training
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of,"
said the Exalted One.

14. "And again, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikkhu,
by passing beyond the consciousness of form,
by putting an end to the sense of resistance,
by paying no heed to the idea of distinction,
thinking:

'The space is infinite,'

reaches up to and remains in the mental state
in which [250] the mind is concerned
only with the consciousness
of the infinity of space.

Then the consciousness,
that he previously had, of form
passes away,
and there arises in him
the blissful consciousness,
subtle but yet actual,
of his being concerned
only with the infinity of space.

And he becomes a person conscious of that.

Thus also is it
that through training
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of," said the Exalted One.

[184] 15. "And again, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikkhu,
by passing quite beyond
the consciousness of space as infinite,
thinking:

'Cognition[15] is infinite,'

reaches up to
and remains in the mental state
in which the mind is concerned
only with the infinity of cognition.

Then the subtle,
but yet actual, consciousness,
that he just had,
of the infinity of space,
passes away.

And there arises in him
a consciousness,
subtle but yet actual,
of everything being within
the sphere of the infinity of cognition.

And he becomes a person conscious of that.

Thus also is
it that through training
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of," said the Exalted One.

16. "And again, Poṭṭhapāda, the Bhikkhu,
by passing quite beyond
the consciousness of the infinity of cognition,
thinking:

'There is nothing that really is,'

reaches up to and remains in
the mental state
in which the mind is concerned
only with the unreality of things.

Then that sense
of everything being within
the sphere of infinite cognition,
that he just had,
passes away.

And there arises in him a consciousness,
subtle but yet actual,
of unreality
as the object of his thought.[16]

And he becomes a person conscious of that.

[251] Thus also is it
that through training
one idea, one sort of consciousness, arises;
and through training
another passes away.

This is the training I spoke of,"
said the Exalted One.

 

§

 

17. 'So from the time, Poṭṭhapāda,
that the Bhikkhu is thus conscious
in a way brought about by himself
(from the time of the First Rapture),
he goes on from one stage to the next,
and from that to the next
until he reaches the summit of consciousness.

And when he is on the summit
it may occur to him:

'To be thinking at all
is the inferior state.

Twere better not to be thinking.

Were I to go on thinking and fancying,[17]
these ideas,
these states of consciousness,
I have reached to,
would pass away,
but others,
coarser ones,
might arise.

So I will neither think
nor fancy
any more.'

And he does not.

And to him
neither thinking any more,
nor fancying,
the ideas,
the states of consciousness, he had,
pass away;
and no others,
coarser than they,
arise.

So he falls into trance.

Thus is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that the attainment of
the cessation of conscious ideas
takes place step by step.

 

§

 

18. Now what do you think, Poṭṭhapāda?

Have you ever heard, before this,
of this gradual attainment
of the cessation of conscious ideas?"

"No, Sir, I have not.

But I now understand what you say as follows:

From the time, Sir,
that the Bhikkhu is thus conscious
in a way brought about by himself
(from the time of the First Rapture),
he goes on from one stage to the next,
and from that to the next
until he reaches the summit of consciousness.

And when he is on the summit
it may occur to him:

'To be thinking at all is the inferior state.

'Twere better not to be thinking.

Were I to go on thinking and fancying,
these ideas,
these states of consciousness,
I have reached to,
would pass away,
but others,
coarser ones,
might arise.

So I will neither think
nor fancy any more.'

And he does not.

And to him
neither thinking any more, nor fancying,
the ideas,
the states of consciousness, he had,
pass away;
and no others,
coarser than they,
arise.

So he falls into trance.

Thus is it, Sir,
that the attainment of
the cessation of conscious ideas
takes place step by step."

"That is right, Poṭṭhapāda."[18]

 

§

 

[185] 19. "And does the Exalted One teach
that there is one summit of consciousness,
or that there are several?"

[252] "In my opinion, Poṭṭhapāda, there is one,
and there are also several."

"But how can the Exalted teach
that there both is one,
and that there are also several?"

"As he attains to the cessation
(of one idea, one state of consciousness)
after another,
so does he reach,
one after another,
to different summits
up to the last.

So is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that I put forward
both one summit and several."

 

§

 

20. "Now is it, Sir, the idea,
the state of consciousness,
that arises first,
and then knowledge;
or does knowledge arise first,
and then the idea,
the state of consciousness;
or do both arise simultaneously,
neither of them before
or after the other?"

"It is the idea, Poṭṭhapāda,
the state of consciousness,
that arises first,
and after that knowledge.

And the springing up of knowledge
is dependent on the springing up of the idea,
of the state of consciousness.[19]

And this may be understood from the fact
that a man recognises:

'It is from this cause or that
that knowledge has arisen to me.'"

 

§

 

21. "Is then, Sir, the consciousness
identical with a man's soul,
or is consciousness one thing,
and the soul another?"[20]

"But what then, Poṭṭhapāda?

Do you really fall back on the soul?"

[186] "I take for granted,[21] Sir,
a material soul,
having [253] form,
built up of the four elements,
nourished by solid food."[22]

"And if there were such a soul, Poṭṭhapāda,
then, even so,
your consciousness would be one thing,
and your soul another.

That, Poṭṭhapāda, you may know
by the following considerations:

Granting, Poṭṭhapāda, a material soul,
having form,
built up of the four elements,
nourished by solid food;
still some ideas,
some states of consciousness,
would arise to the man,
and others would pass away.

On this account also, Poṭṭhapāda,
you can see
how consciousness must be one thing,
and soul another."

22. "Then, Sir, I fall back on a soul
made of mind,
with all its major and minor parts complete,
not deficient in any organ."[23]

"And granting, Poṭṭhapāda,
you had such a soul,
the same argument would apply."

[187] 23. "Then, Sir, I fall back on a soul without form,
and made of consciousness."

"And granting, Poṭṭhapāda, you had such a soul,
still the same argument would apply."[24]

[254] 24. "But is it possible, Sir,
for me to understand
whether consciousness is the man's soul,
or the one is different from the other?"

"Hard is it for you, Poṭṭhapāda,
holding, as you do, different views,
other things approving themselves to you,
setting different aims before yourself,
striving, after a different perfection,
trained in a different system of doctrine,
to grasp this matter!"

25-27. "Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[1] Is the world eternal?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[2] Is the world not eternal?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[3] Is the world finite?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[4] Is the world infinite?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

'Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[188] [5] Is the soul the same as the body?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[6] Is the soul one thing,
and the body another?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[7] Does one who has gained the truth
live again after death?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[8] Does he not live again after death?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[9] Does he both live again,
and not live again,
after death?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."

"Then, Sir, if that be so,
tell me at least:

[10] Does he neither live again,
nor not live again,
after death?

Is this alone the truth,
and any other view mere folly?"

"That too, Poṭṭhapāda, is a matter
on which I have expressed no opinion."[25]

28. "But why has the Exalted One expressed no opinion on that?"

"This question is not calculated to profit,
it is not [255] concerned with the Norm
(the Dhamma),
it does not redound
even to the elements of right conduct,
nor to detachment,
nor to purification from lusts,
nor to quietude,
nor to tranquillisation of heart,
nor to real knowledge,
nor to the insight
(of the higher stages of the Path),
nor to Nirvāṇa.

Therefore is it
that I express no opinion upon it."

 

§

 

[189] 29. "Then what is it
that the Exalted One has determined?"

"I have expounded, Poṭṭhapāda,
what pain[26] is;
I have expounded what is the origin of pain;
I have expounded what is the cessation of pain;
I have expounded what is the method
by which one may reach the cessation of pain."[27]

30. "And why has the Exalted One
put forth a statement as to that?"

"Because that question, Poṭṭhapāda,
is calculated to profit,
is concerned with the Norm,
redounds to the beginnings of right conduct,
to detachment,
to purification from lusts,
to quietude,
to tranquillisation of heart,
to real knowledge,
to the insight of the higher stages of the Path,
and to Nirvāṇa.

Therefore is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that I have put forward a statement as to that."

"That is so, O Exalted One.

That is so, O Happy One.

And now let the Exalted One do what seemeth to him fit."

And the Exalted One rose from his seat,
and departed thence.

 

§

 

31. Now no sooner had the Exalted One gone away
than those mendicants
bore down upon Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant,
from all sides
with a torrent of jeering
and biting words,[28]
saying:

"Just so forsooth,
this Poṭṭhapāda gives vent
to approval of whatsoever the Samaṇa [256] Gotama says,
with his:

'That is so, O Exalted One.

That is so, O Happy One.'

Now we, on the other hand,
fail to see that the Samaṇa Gotama
has put forward any doctrine
that is distinct
with regard to any one of the ten points raised:

[1] Is the world eternal?

[2] Is the world not eternal?

[3] Is the world finite?

[4] Is the world infinite?

[5] Is the soul the same as the body?

[6] Is the soul one thing,
and the body another?

[7] Does one who has gained the truth
live again after death?

[8] Does he not live again after death?

[9] Does he both live again,
and not live again,
after death?

[10] Does he neither live again,
nor not live again,
after death?"

[190] But when they spake
thus Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant, replied:

"Neither do I see
that he puts forward,
as certain,
any proposition with respect to those points.

But the Samaṇa Gotama propounds a method
in accordance with the nature of things,
true and fit,
based on the Norm,
and certain by reason of the Norm.

And how could I refuse to approve,
as well said,
what has been so well said
by the Samaṇa Gotama
as he propounded that?"

 

§

 

32. Now after the lapse of two or three days
Citta, the son of the elephant trainer,[29]
and Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant,
came to the place where the Exalted One was staying.

And on their arrival
Citta, the son of the elephant trainer,
bowed low to the Exalted One,
and took his scat on one side.

And Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant,
exchanged with the Exalted One
the greetings and compliments of courtesy and friendship,
and took his seat on one side,
and when he was so seated
he told the Exalted One:

"When the Exalted One rose from his seat,
and departed those mendicants
bore down upon me,
from all sides
with a torrent of jeering
and biting words,
saying:

'Just so forsooth,
this Poṭṭhapāda gives vent
to approval of whatsoever the Samaṇa Gotama says,
with his:

"That is so, O Exalted One.

That is so, O Happy One."

Now we, on the other hand,
fail to see that the Samaṇa Gotama
has put forward any doctrine
that is distinct
with regard to any one of the ten points raised:

[1] Is the world eternal?

[2] Is the world not eternal?

[3] Is the world finite?

[4] Is the world infinite?

[5] Is the soul the same as the body?

[6] Is the soul one thing,
and the body another?

[7] Does one who has gained the truth
live again after death?

[8] Does he not live again after death?

[9] Does he both live again,
and not live again,
after death?

[10] Does he neither live again,
nor not live again,
after death?'

But when they spake
thus I replied:

'Neither do I see
that he puts forward,
as certain,
any proposition with respect to those points.

But the Samaṇa Gotama propounds a method
in accordance with the nature of things,
true and fit,
based on the Norm,
and certain by reason of the Norm.

And how could I refuse to approve,
as well said,
what has been so well said
by the Samaṇa Gotama
as he propounded that?'"

[191] 33. "All those mendicants, Poṭṭhapāda, are blind,
and see not.

You are the only one,
with eyes to see,
among them.

Some things, Poṭṭhapāda,
I have laid down as certain,
other things I have declared un- [257] certain.

The latter
are those ten questions:

[1] Is the world eternal?

[2] Is the world not eternal?

[3] Is the world finite?

[4] Is the world infinite?

[5] Is the soul the same as the body?

[6] Is the soul one thing,
and the body another?

[7] Does one who has gained the truth
live again after death?

[8] Does he not live again after death?

[9] Does he both live again,
and not live again,
after death?

[10] Does he neither live again,
nor not live again,
after death?'

And because these questions are not calculated to profit,
not concerned with the Norm
(the Dhamma),
do not redound
even to the elements of right conduct,
nor to detachment,
nor to purification from lusts,
nor to quietude,
nor to tranquillisation of heart,
nor to real knowledge,
nor to the insight
(of the higher stages of the Path),
nor to Nirvāṇa
I hold them matters of uncertainty.

Therefore is it
that I express no opinion upon them.

The former,
the Four Truths I expounded:
what pain is;
what the origin of pain is;
what the cessation of pain is;
what the method
by which one may reach the cessation of pain is.

And why?

Because that, Poṭṭhapāda,
is calculated to profit,
is concerned with the Norm,
redounds to the beginnings of right conduct,
to detachment,
to purification from lusts,
to quietude,
to tranquillisation of heart,
to real knowledge,
to the insight of the higher stages of the Path,
and to Nirvāṇa.

Therefore is it, Poṭṭhapāda,
that I have put forward a statement as to that
and I hold them to be matters of certainty.

 

§

 

[192] 34. There are some Samaṇas and Brahmans Poṭṭhapāda,
who hold the following opinion,
indulge in the following speculation:

'The soul is perfectly happy
and healthy after death.'

And I went to them, and asked them
whether that was their view or not.

And they acknowledged that it was.[30]

And I asked them whether,
so far as they were in the habit
of knowing or perceiving it,[31]
the world
(that is, the people in the world)
was perfectly happy,
and they answered:

'No.'

Then I asked them:

'Or further, Sirs,
can you maintain that you yourselves
for a whole night,
or for a whole day,
or even for half a night or day,
have ever been perfectly happy?'

And they answered:

'No.'

Then I said to them:

'Or further, Sirs,
do you know a way,
or a method,
by which you can realise a state
that is altogether happy?'

And still to that question they answered:

'No.'

And then I said:

'Or have you, Sirs,
ever heard the voices of gods
who had realised rebirth
in a perfectly happy world,
saying:

"Be earnest, O men,
and direct in effort,
towards the realisation of
(rebirth in)
a world of perfect happiness.

For we, in consequence of similar effort,
have been reborn in such a world."'

And still they answered:

'No.'

Now what think you as to that, Poṭṭhapāda?

That being so,
does not the talk of those Samaṇas and Brahmans
turn out to be without good ground?[32]

[193] [258] 35.[33] Just as if a man should say:

'How I long for,
how I love
the most beautiful woman in the land!'

And people should ask him:

'Well! good friend!

This most beautiful woman in the land,
whom you so love and long for,
do you know whether that beautiful woman
is a noble lady,
or of priestly rank,
or of the trader class,
or of menial birth?'

'And when so asked,
he should answer:

'No.'

-◦-

And people should ask him:

'Well! good friend!

This most beautiful woman in the land,
whom you so love and long for,
do you know what her name is,
or her family name,
or whether she be tall,
or short,
or of medium height;
whether she be dark
or brunette
or golden in colour;[34]
or in what village,
or town,
or city she dwells?

And when so asked,
he should answer:

'No.'

-◦-

And people should say to him:

'So then, good friend,
whom you know not,
neither have seen,
her do you love
and long for?

And when so asked, he should answer:

'Yes.'

-◦-

Now what think you of that, Poṭṭhapāda?

Would it not turn out,
that being so,
that the talk of that man
was witless talk?

[194] [259] 36, 37. Then just so also, Poṭṭhapāda,
was it with the Samaṇas and Brahmans
who talk about the soul
being perfectly happy
and healthy after death:[35]

I went to them,
and asked them
whether that was their view or not.

And they acknowledged that it was.

And I asked them whether,
so far as they were in the habit
of knowing or perceiving it,
the world
(that is, the people in the world)
was perfectly happy,
and they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

Then I asked them:

'Or further, Sirs,
can you maintain that you yourselves
for a whole night,
or for a whole day,
or even for half a night or day,
have ever been perfectly happy?'

And they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

Then I said to them:

'Or further, Sirs,
do you know a way,
or a method,
by which you can realise a state
that is altogether happy?'

And still to that question they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

And then I said:

'Or have you, Sirs,
ever heard the voices of gods
who had realised rebirth in a perfectly happy world,
saying:

"Be earnest, O men,
and direct in effort,
towards the realisation of
(rebirth in)
a world of perfect happiness.

For we, in consequence of similar effort,
have been reborn in such a world."'

And still they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

Now what think you as to that, Poṭṭhapāda?

That being so,
does not the talk of those Samaṇas and Brahmans
turn out to be without good ground?

It is just, Poṭṭhapāda,
as if a man were to put up a staircase
in a place where four cross roads meet,
to mount up thereby
on to the upper storey of a mansion.

And people should say to him:

'Well! good friend!

This mansion,
to mount up into which
you are making this staircase,
do you know whether it is in the East,
or in the West,
or in the South,
or in the North?
whether it is high,
or low,
or of medium size?'

And when so asked,
he should answer:

'No.'

-◦-

And people should say to him:

'But then, good friend,
you are making a staircase
to mount up into a mansion
you know not of,
neither have seen!

And when so asked,
he should answer:

'Yes.'

-◦-

Now what think you of that, Poṭṭhapāda?

Would it not turn out,
that being so,
that the talk of that man
was witless talk?"

"For a truth, Sir,
that being so,
his talk would turn out to be witless talk."

Then just so also, Poṭṭhapāda,
was it with the Samaṇas and Brahmans
who talk about the soul
being perfectly happy
and healthy after death:

I went to them,
and asked them
whether that was their view or not.

And they acknowledged that it was.

And I asked them whether,
so far as they were in the habit
of knowing or perceiving it,
the world
(that is, the people in the world)
was perfectly happy,
and they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

Then I asked them:

'Or further, Sirs,
can you maintain that you yourselves
for a whole night,
or for a whole day,
or even for half a night or day,
have ever been perfectly happy?'

And they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

Then I said to them:

'Or further, Sirs,
do you know a way,
or a method,
by which you can realise a state
that is altogether happy?'

And still to that question they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

And then I said:

'Or have you, Sirs,
ever heard the voices of gods
who had realised rebirth in a perfectly happy world,
saying:

"Be earnest, O men,
and direct in effort,
towards the realisation of
(rebirth in)
a world of perfect happiness.

For we, in consequence of similar effort,
have been reborn in such a world."'

And still they answered:

'No.'

-◦-

Now what think you as to that, Poṭṭhapāda?[36]

That being so,
does not the talk of those Samaṇas and Brahmans
turn out to be without good ground?"

[195] "For a truth, Sir,
that being so,
their talk would turn out to be without good ground.

 

§

 

39. 'The following three modes of personality, Poṭṭhapāda,
(are commonly acknowledged in the world): —
[1] material,
[2] immaterial, and
[3] formless.[37]

The [260] first has form,
is made up of the four elements,
and is nourished by solid food.

The second has no form,
is made up of mind,
has all its greater and lesser limbs complete,
and all the organs perfect.

The third is without form,
and is made up
of consciousness only.

40. 'Now I teach a doctrine, Poṭṭhapāda,
with respect to the material mode of personality,[38]
that leads to the putting off
of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;[39]
the dispositions which tend to purification[40]
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom.

-◦-

41. I teach a doctrine, Poṭṭhapāda,
with respect to the immaterial mode of personality,
that leads to the putting off
of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;
the dispositions which tend to purification
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom.

-◦-

42. I teach a doctrine, Poṭṭhapāda,
with respect to the formless mode of personality,
that leads to the putting off of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;
the dispositions which tend to purification
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom.

[196] Now it may well be, Poṭṭhapāda,
that you think Evil dispositions may be put away,
the dis- [261] positions that tend to purification
may increase,
one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom,
but one may continue sad.

Now that, Poṭṭhapāda,
would not be accurate judgement.

When such conditions are fulfilled,
then there will be joy,
and happiness,
and peace,
and in continual mindfulness and self-mastery,
one will dwell at ease.

 

§

 

[197] 43-45. And outsiders, Poṭṭhapāda,
might question, us thus:

'What then, Sir,
is that material
(or that mental, or, that formless)
mode of personality
for the putting away of which
you preach such a doctrine
as will lead him who walks according to it
to get free from
the evil dispositions he has acquired,
to increase
in the dispositions that tend to purification,
so that he may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom?'

And to that I should reply:[41]

'The following three modes of personality,
are common,
(are commonly acknowledged in the world): —
[1] material,
[2] immaterial, and
[3] formless.

The first has form,
is made up of the four elements,
and is nourished by solid food.

The second has no form,
is made up of mind,
has all its greater and lesser limbs complete,
and all the organs perfect.

The third is without form,
and is made up of consciousness only.

Now I teach a doctrine,
with respect to each of these,
that leads to the putting off of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;
the dispositions which tend to purification
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom.'

[198] Now what think you of that, Poṭṭhapāda.

That being so,
would not the talk
turn out to be well grounded?"

"For a truth, Sir, it would."

46. "Just, Poṭṭhapāda, as if a man
should construct a staircase
to mount up into
the upper storey of a palace,
at the foot of the very palace itself.

And men should say to him:[42]

'Well! good friend! that palace,
to mount up into which
you are constructing this staircase,
do you know whether it is in the East,
or in the West,
or in the [262] South,
or in the North?
whether it is high
or low
or of medium size?'

And when so asked, he should answer:

'Why! here is the very palace itself!

It is at the very foot of it
I am constructing my staircase
with the object of mounting up into it.'

What would you think, Poṭṭhapāda, of that?

Would not his talk,
that being so,
turn out to be well grounded?"

"For a truth, Sir it would."

[199] 47. "Then just so, Poṭṭhapāda,[43] I teach a doctrine, Poṭṭhapāda,
with respect to the material mode of personality,
that leads to the putting off
of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;
the dispositions which tend to purification
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom.

-◦-

I teach a doctrine, Poṭṭhapāda,
with respect to the immaterial mode of personality,
that leads to the putting off
of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;
the dispositions which tend to purification
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom.

-◦-

I teach a doctrine, Poṭṭhapāda,
with respect to the formless mode of personality,
that leads to the putting off
of that personality;
so that, if you walk according to that doctrine,
the evil dispositions one has acquired
may be put away;
the dispositions which tend to purification
may increase;
and one may continue to see
face-to-face,
and by himself come to realise,
the full perfection and grandeur
of wisdom."

 

§

 

48. Now when he had thus spoken,
Citta, the son of the elephant trainer,
said to the Exalted One:

"At that time, Sir,
when a man is in possession
of the material mode of personality,
is the immaterial mode of personality unreal to him then,
is the formless mode of personality unreal to him then?

Is it only the one he has
that is real?[44]

-◦-

At that time, Sir,
when a man is in possession
of the immaterial mode of personality,
is the material mode of personality unreal to him then,
is the formless mode of personality unreal to him then?

Is it only the one he has
that is real?

-◦-

At that time, Sir,
when a man is in possession
of the formless mode of personality,
is the material mode of personality unreal to him then,
is the immaterial mode of personality unreal to him then?

Is it only the one he has
that is real?"

49. At the time, Citta,
when a man is in possession
of the material mode of personality,
then it does not come under the immaterial category
it does not come under the formless category.

It is known only by the name of the mode going on.

At the time, Citta,
when a man is in possession
of the immaterial mode of personality,
then it does not come under the material category
it does not come under the formless category.

It is known only by the name of the mode going on.

At the time, Citta,
when a man is in possession
of the formless mode of personality,
then it does not come under the material category
it does not come under the immaterial category.

It is known only by the name of the mode going on.

[200] If people should ask you, Citta, thus:

'Were you in the past, or not?

Will you be in the future, or not?

Are you now, or not?'

How would you answer?"

"I should say that I was in the past,
and not not;
that I shall be in the future,
and not not;
that I am now,
and not not."

50. "Then if they rejoined:

'Well! that past personality that you had,
is that real to you;
and the future personality,
and the present,
unreal?'

The future personality that you will have,
is that real to you;
and the past personality,
and the present,
unreal?

The personality that you have now,
in the present,
is that real to you;
and the past personality,
and the future,
unreal?'

How would you answer?"

[263] "I should say that
the past personality that I had
was real to me
at the time when I had it;
and the future personality,
and the present personality
were unreal.

I should say that
the future personality that I would have
would be real to me
at the time when I had it;
and the past personality,
and the present personality
would then be unreal.

"I should say that
the present personality that I have
is real to me
at the time when I have it;
and the past personality,
and the future personality
were unreal."

51. "Well! Just so, Citta,
when any one of the three modes of personality is going on,
then it does not come under the category
of either of the other two.

52. Just, Citta, as from a cow comes milk,
and from the milk curds,
and from the curds butter,
and from the butter ghee,
and from the ghee junket;
but when it is milk
it is not called curds,
or butter,
or, or junket;
and when it is curds
it is not called milk,
or butter,
or ghee,
or junket;
and when it is butter,
it is not called milk,
or curds,
or ghee,
or junket;
and when it is ghee,
it is not called milk,
or curds,
or butter,
or junket;
and when it is junket,
it is not called milk,
or curds,
or butter,
or ghee.

[202] 53. Just so, Citta at the time
when a man is in possession
of the material mode of personality,
then it does not come under the immaterial category
it does not come under the formless category.

It is known only by the name of the mode going on.

At the time
when a man is in possession
of the immaterial mode of personality,
then it does not come under the material category
it does not come under the formless category.

It is known only by the name of the mode going on.

At the time
when a man is in possession
of the formless mode of personality,
then it does not come under the material category
it does not come under the immaterial category.

It is known only by the name of the mode going on.

For these, Citta, are merely names,
expressions turns of speech,
designations in common use in the world.

And of these
a Tathāgata
(one who has won the truth)
makes use indeed,
but is not led astray by them."[45]

 

§

 

54. And when he had thus spoken,
Poṭṭhapāda, the mendicant,
said to the Exalted One:

"Most excellent, Sir,
are the words of thy mouth;
most excellent!

Just as if a man were to set up
that which has been thrown down,
or were to reveal
that which has been hidden away,
or were to point out the right road
to him who has gone astray,
or were to bring a light into the darkness
so that those who had eyes could see external forms, -
just even so has the truth [264] been made known,
in many a figure,
by the Exalted One.

And I, Sir,
betake myself to the Exalted One
as my guide,
to his Doctrine,
and to his Order.

May the Exalted One accept me
as an adherent;
as one who,
from this day forth
as long as life endures,
has taken him as his guide."

55. But Citta, the son of the elephant trainer
said this:

"Most excellent, Sir,
are the words of thy mouth;
most excellent!

Just as if a man were to set up
that which has been thrown down,
or were to reveal
that which has been hidden away,
or were to point out the right road
to him who has gone astray,
or were to bring a light into the darkness
so that those who had eyes could see external forms, -
just even so has the truth been made known,
in many a figure,
by the Exalted One.

And I, Sir,
betake myself to the Exalted One
as my guide,
to his Doctrine,
and to his Order.

May the Exalted One accept me
as an adherent;
as one who,
from this day forth
as long as life endures,
has taken him as his guide.

And may I be permitted
to go forth from the world
under the Exalted One;
may I receive admission into his Order."

[203] 56. And his request was granted,
and he was received into the Order.

And from immediately after his initiation
Citta, the son of the elephant trainer,
remained alone and separate,
earnest,
zealous,
and resolved.

And e'er long
he attained to that supreme goal of the higher life
for the sake of which the clansmen go forth utterly
from the household life
to become houseless wanderers —
yea! that supreme goal did he,
by himself,
and while yet in this visible world,
bring himself to the knowledge of,
and continue to realise,
and to see face-to-face!

And he became conscious
that rebirth was at an end;
that the higher life had been fulfilled;
that all that should be done
had been accomplished;
and that, after this present life,
there would be no beyond!

So the venerable Citta,
the son of the elephant trainer,
became yet another among the Arahats.

 

HERE ENDS THE POṬṬHAPĀDA SUTTANTA

 


[1] See above, p. 189.

[2] For souls inside animals, see Rig-veda I,163, 6; for souls inside plants, Atharva-veda V, 5, 7.

[3] See the authorities quoted in my 'American Lectures,' pp. 64, 65.

[4] This, for the reasons given above at p. 195, is probably a gotta name; and, as such, a patronymic from the personal name, also Poṭṭhapāda, meaning 'born under Poṭṭhapāda (the old name for the 25th lunar asterism, afterwards called Bhadrapadā). Buddhaghosa says that as a layman he had been a wealthy man of the Brahman Vaṇṇa. If so, it is noteworthy that he addresses the Buddha, not as Gotama, but as bhante.

[5] The very fact of the erection of such a place is another proof of the freedom of thought prevalent in the Eastern valley of the Ganges in the sixth century B.C. Buddhaghosa tells us that after 'The Hall' had been established, others near it had been built in honour of various famous teachers; but the group of buildings continued to be known as 'The Hall.' There Brahmans, Nigaṇṭhas, Acelas, Paribbājakas, and other teachers met and expounded, or discussed, their views.

It is mentioned elsewhere. See M. II, 22; Sum. I, 32.

Mallikā was one of the queens of Pasenadi, king of Kosala. See Jāt. III, 405; IV, 437.

[6] §§ 2-6 recur, nearly, at M. I, 513; II, 1, 2 S. IV, 398.

[7] For notes on this list, see above, p. 14, § 17.

[8] Idhāgamanāya pariyāyaɱ akāsi. So M. I, 252, 326, 481, 514, etc. Perhaps 'since you made this change in your regular habits.'

Abhisaññā-nirodho. Over-perception-ending. Observing ending.

p.p. explains it all — p.p.

[9] Abhisaññā-nirodho, 'the cessation of consciousness.'

[10] Buddhaghosa explains that they came to this conclusion on the ground of such instances as that of the Rishi Migasingī, who, through love of the celestial nymph Alambusā, fell into a trance that lasted for three years. This must be a different tale from that of the Rishi Isisinga of Jātaka No. 523, whom Alambusā tries in vain to seduce. Compare Vimāna Vatthu XVIII, 11; L, 2 6.

[11] Buddhaghosa explains that the ground for this view is the way in which sorcerers work charms (Athabbanikā athabbanaɱ payogenti — perhaps 'Atharva priests work out an Atharva charm') which make a man appear as dead as if his head had been cut off; and then bring him back to his natural condition.

[12] Saññā-nirodhassa pakataññū. So Buddhaghosa. Compare Vin. II, 199.

[13] Saññā which is used in a sense covering both 'idea' and 'consciousness.' Ekā'saññā is therefore rendered below, in the refrain, one idea, one sort of consciousness.'

[14] Sukha and dukkha. Well-fare and ill-fare, well-being and ill-being, ease and dis-ease, uneasiness, discomfort. 'Pain' is both too strong a word, and has too frequently an exclusively physical sense, to be a good rendering of dukkha. It is unfortunate that dis-ease has acquired a special connotation which prevents the word being used here; and that we have no pair of correlative words corresponding to those in the Pāli. For pain we have vedanā often (M. I, 10; M.P.S., chapters 2 and 4; Mil. 134), and sometimes dukkha-vedanā (Mil. 112).

[15] Viññāṇa; the exact translation of this word is still uncertain. Perhaps 'mind,' is meant.

[16] On these last three sections, which set out the fourth, fifth, and sixth stages of Deliverance (the Vimokkhas), see my former translation at p. 52 of my 'Buddhist Suttas' (S.B.E.) and the notes on pp. 50, 51. These stages are almost exactly the same as the views controverted above at pp. 47, 48. And the doctrine of the sixth Vimokkha, as we see from M. I, 164, formed part of the teaching of Gotama's teacher, Ālāra Kālāma.

[17] Abhisaɱkhareyyaɱ, perhaps 'perfecting' or 'planning out.'

[18] The foregoing discussion on trance is the earliest one on that subject in Indian literature. Trance is not mentioned in the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads.

[19] Ñāṇa depends on saññā; that is, I take it, that the mass of knowledge a man has, his insight, his power of judgement, depends on the ideas, the states of consciousness (here, in this connection, those that arise in the Jhānas, etc.) that are 'themselves due to the action on his sense organs of the outside world; but are in so far under his own control that he can shut out some, and give play to others.

[20] Buddhaghosa says that as a village pig, even if you bathe it in scented water, and anoint it with perfumes, and deck it with garlands, and lay it to rest on the best bed, will not feel happy there, but will go straight back to the dung-heap to take its ease; so Poṭṭhapāda, having tasted the sweet taste of the doctrine of the Three Signs (of the impermanence, the pain, and the absence of any abiding principle) found in everything, harks back to the superstition of the 'soul.'

[21] Paccemi. This is another of the words the exact sense of which, in Piṭaka times, is still doubtful. It means primarily 'to go back towards, to revert,' and is so used in the Piṭakas. So in G. V, 196 and in SN. 662 (quoted as verse 125 in the Dhammapada, and recurring also G. III, 203; S. I, 13, 164). But somewhat in the same way as to go back home is to go to a place of security; so in a secondary sense, of opinions or reasons, it means apparently to revert to them, fall back on them, harp on them, with the connotation of regarding them as certain. At S.N. 803 it can be taken either way. At S.N. 788, 803, 840 = 908; M. I, 309, 445, and in the question and answer here, the latter seems to be the sense.

[22] Buddhaghosa says this was not his real opinion. He held to that set out below in § 23. But he advances this, more elementary, proposition, just to see how the Buddha would meet it. It is nearly the same as the first of the seven propositions about the soul controverted in the Brahma-jāla (above, PP. 46-48).

[23] This sort of soul is nearly the same as the one referred to above, the Brahma-jāla (§ 12, p. 47); and in the Sāmañña-phala (§ 85, p.87). It is a soul the exact copy, in every respect, of the body, and material, but so subtle that it can be described as 'made of mind.'

[24] The text repeats the answer given in § 21, with the necessary alterations. The supposition in § 23 is quoted at Asl. 360. The argument is of course that, even if Poṭṭhapāda had any one of these three sorts of soul, then he would regard each of them, in the given case, as a permanent entity. But the consciousness is not an entity. It is a 'becoming' only; subject, as he must (and would) admit, to constant chance. On his own showing then, it is not 'soul.'

[25] On these Ten Indeterminates see above, in the Introduction to the Mahāli Sutta.

[26] Dukkha. See the note above on § 13.

[27] These are the Four Truths, set out more fully in my 'Buddhist Suttas' (S.B.E.), pp. 148-150.

[28] Vācāya sannitodakena sañjambhariɱ akaɱsu. So also at S. II, 282 and A. I, 187. Probably from the roots tud and jambh.

[29] There are seven or eight Cittas in the books, one of whom, a layman, was placed by the Buddha at the head of the expounders of the Norm. The Citta of our passage was famous for the fact that he joined the Buddha's Order, and then, on one pretext or another, left it again, no less than seven times. (The same thing is related by I-Tsing of Bhartṛihari) He prided himself on his keenness in distinguishing subtle differences in the meanings of words. And his last revolt was owing to a discussion of that sort he had had with Mahā Koṭṭhita. He took refuge with his friend Poṭṭhapāda, who, says Buddhaghosa, brought him along with him, on this occasion, with the express purpose of bringing. about a reconciliation.

[30] Compare above, pp. 44-47.

[31] Buddhaghosa takes janaɱ passaɱ as plurals.

[32] Appāṭihīrakataɱ. Buddhaghosa explains this as 'witless' (paṭibhāna-virahitaɱ). It is the contrary of sappāṭihīrakataɱ which he explains (on § 45 below) by sappaṭiviharaṇaɱ. Perhaps the meaning of the two words is 'apposite' and 'not apposite' (compare B.R. on pratiharaṇa).

There is a closely-allied expression at M.P. 8., pp. 26, 32, where the talk is of disciples who, when a discussion on a wrong opinion has arisen, know how to refute it according to the doctrine (Dharma), and to preach, on the other hand, a doctrine that is sappāṭihāriyaɱ; that is, a doctrine which, in contradistinction to the heresy advanced, is the apposite explanation from the Buddhist point of view. The Pāli word for miracle comes from the same root (prati-har); but to render here 'unmiraculous' would make nonsense of the passage, and both my own and Windisch's rendering of the word in the M.P.S. ('Buddhist Suttas,' p. 43. Māra und Buddha,' p.71) must be also modified accordingly.

On the form compare anuhīramāne, quoted at Sum. I, 61 from the Mahā-padhāna Suttanta (No. 14 in the Dīgha).

[33] This simile recurs. in the 'Tevijja Sutta' (translated in my, 'Buddhist Suttas,' S.B.E., XI, 175) and in the Majjhima II, 33.

[34] Mangura-c-chavī. Perhaps 'of sallow complexion.' Compare M. I, 246 where all these three words for complexion are used. Mangulī itthī at V. III, 107 = S. II, 260 is an allied form. In all these cases an unhealthy complexion is inferred. Here it must evidently be taken in a favourable sense.

[35] [picked up from § 34]

[36] [picked up from § 34]

[37] Oḷāriko, manomayo, and arūpo atta-paṭilābho. Buddhaghosa here explains atta-paṭilābho by attabhāva-paṭilābho; and on attabhāva he says (Asl. 308) that it is used for the body, or the five Skandhas, because the fool jumps to the conclusion: 'This is my soul.'

These three forms of personality correspond nearly to the planes, or divisions, into which the worlds are divided in the later Buddhist theory — (1) the eleven kāmā-vacara worlds, from purgatory below to the deva heavens above, both inclusive: (2) the rūpā-vacara worlds, which are the sixteen worlds of the Brahma gods, and are attained to by the practice of the Four Raptures (the Four Jhāna's): (3) the four arūpā-vacara worlds, attained to by the practice of four of the Vimokkhas (Nos. 4-7).

It will be noticed that the lowest of these three planes includes all the forms of existence known in the West, from hell beneath to heaven above. And that the others are connected with the pre-Buddhistic idea of ecstatic meditation leading to special forms of re-existence.

But it is clear from § 58 below that the opinion here put forward is intended to represent, not any Buddhist theory, but a view commonly entertained in the world, such as Poṭṭhapāda himself would admit, and indeed has admitted (above, §§ 21-23). In either case, of course, these modes of existence would be, from the Buddhist point of view, purely temporary. They are the fleeting union of qualities that make up, for a time only, an unstable individuality.

[38] The whole paragraph is repeated for each of the three modes of personality.

[39] These saŋkilesikā dhammā are identified by Buddhaghosa, with the twelve kāmā-vacara-akusala-citta-pādā of Dhamma Saɱgaṇi 365-430. But compare, contra, Dh.S. 1241 (where, of course, the word apariyāpannā must be struck out).

[40] Buddhaghosa explains these as 'tranquillity and insight.'

[41] In the words of §§ 39, 40; that is, that whatever the mode of existence, of temporary individuality, there is happiness obtainable, but only in one way, by getting rid, namely, of certain evil dispositions, and by the increase of certain good dispositions. Buddhaghosa thinks this is said in protest against those who, seeking for happiness beyond the grave, do not admit that happiness can he reached here (as above in f 34).

The above rendering of the elliptical phrase Ayaɱ vā so is confirmed by the simile in § 46.

[42] See above, § 37.

[43] [Picked up from §§ 42-45]

[44] Each of the three cases is given in full.

[45] The point is, of course, that just as there is no substratum in the products of the cow, so in man there is no ego, no constant unity, no 'soul' (in the animistic sense of the word, as used by savages). There are a number of qualities that, when united, make up a personality — always changing. When the change has reached a certain point, it is convenient to change the designation, the name, by which the personality is known — just as in the case of the products of the cow. But the abstract term is only a convenient form of expression. There never was any personality, as a separate entity, all the time.

The author of the Milinda (pp. 25, 27) has a precisely similar argument.


 [Contents ]   [Preface ]   [#1. Brahma-gāla Suttanta: ]   [#2. Sāmañña-phala Suttanta: ]   [#3. The Ambaṭṭha Suttanta: ]   [#4. The Soṇadaṇḍa Suttanta: ]   [#5. The Kūṭadanta Suttanta: ]   [#6. The Mahāli Suttanta: ]   [#7. Gāliva Suttanta: ]   [#8. Kassapa-Sīhanāda Suttanta: ]   [#9. The Poṭṭhapāda Suttanta: ]   [#10. Subha Suttanta: ]   [#11. Kevaddha Suttanta: ]   [#12. Lohikka Suttanta: ]   [#13. Tevigga Suttanta:


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